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Abstract 
Petroleum has become a greater problem in regard to conflict in the world and 
resources have often been seen as a curse rather than a benefit.   Countries possessing 
such resources often perform more poorly in terms of government, society and the 
economy than other countries that do not possess such riches.  Resources can be used 
to greatly increase the living standards of the population of a country, but this has 
primarily been limited to cases where petroleum resources exist in countries that 
already have good governance. 
Macro-level Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can play a crucial role in helping 
to build better governance and to manage revenue inflows.  This thesis argues for an 
expanded role of CSR in petroleum rich countries which have poor governance.  It 
also asserts that current micro-level CSR is not effective in alleviating the difficulties 
associated with petroleum wealth and in the end might even hinder good governance. 
This thesis supplements existing knowledge by scrutinizing assumptions within the 
field of CSR and political science, and concludes that expanding CSR at the macro-
level will help to improve governance and prosperity which will result in more 
peaceful societies.  These possibilities are illustrated by the seminal CSR work being 
done by BP in Azerbaijan.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation for the project 
Petroleum and petrodollars are important in governance because of the role they play 
in increasing conflict, corruption and poor governance throughout the world.  “Today, 
with violence falling in general, oil-producing states make up a growing fraction of the 
world's conflict-ridden countries. They now host about a third of the world's civil wars, 
both large and small, up from one-fifth in 1992” (Ross 2008).  Oil is a factor in a 
significant number of civil conflicts.  The countries which tend to be most prone to 
conflict are countries that produce 26% of their GDP from a primary commodity 
(Collier 2000).  Improving governance, development and economies affected by or 
prone to conflict is crucial to lasting stability and peace.   
Along with the potential for fueling conflict, petrodollars have adverse effects on the 
quality of government and institutions within many oil producing countries.  The 
money derived from oil may also be used to buttress autocratic or dictatorial 
governments that are not accountable to their people.   The tremendous revenue 
inflows from oil also create greater opportunities for corruption and mismanagement 
of funds.  This can lead to the problems associated with the “resource curse” theory, 
which attempts to explain why many countries that are rich in resources actually end 
up worse off economically than other comparable countries without resources.  The 
distortion of both the government and the economy is deeply disruptive to countries 
that do not have proper institutions to deal with oil revenues. 
 
1.2 Scope and Objective 
My thesis will examine the interactions between the petroleum industry and countries 
having petroleum resources within the area of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine the failings of most current conventional 
micro-level CSR approaches in dealing with the macro-level problems associated with 
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resource extraction.  I will juxtapose the standard micro-level CSR approaches with 
possible macro-level approaches.  I will specifically focus on the necessity of using 
macro-level CSR approaches to deal with the problems faced by such countries.  To 
illustrate these ideas I will use the examples of CSR projects in several countries, 
especially that of British Petroleum (BP) in Azerbaijan.  
This thesis will not attempt to prove a link between the existence of resources and 
increased conflict, but rather to study what corporations operating in unstable regions 
can do to mitigate the negative effects of resource revenues on government corruption 
and how they can possibly assist in improving governance and thereby contribute to 
stability and peace.  “Governance, peace and social stability are interrelated and 
indivisible issues.  Peace and social stability cannot be sustained without good 
governance,” (UNECA).  Democratic Peace theory also argues for positive effects for 
peace of having democratic governments and institutions.  These factors have been the 
subject of much research and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to reiterate them, but 
it is an assumption of this thesis that better government and institutions will aid peace.  
 
1.3 Methodology 
I will compare macro-level CSR approaches with traditional micro-level CSR 
approaches and discuss the strengths and limitation of both approaches.  I will 
primarily utilize existing research and theory on the “resources curse” and the study of 
CSR within the petroleum industry.  I will examine it within the framework of the 
problems associated with the existence of petroleum resources and the issues that those 
resources cause. Through the comparison of cases, I intend to show that broader macro 
level approaches are necessary in order to more effectively deal with these problems.  I 
will use a limited case study of BP’s macro-level CSR role in Azerbaijan to illustrate 
the possibilities such initiatives may have in alleviating the problems associated with 
resource extraction.  I chose to focus on this example because BP has implemented a 
broader macro-level CSR approach and achieved better results than most other oil 
companies using more limited micro-level CSR.  While BP’s CSR role in Azerbaijan 
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is unique in its macro level approach, it still does not rectify all of the problems 
accompanying petroleum wealth.  With this study I hope to supplement existing 
research and add to existing knowledge in the creation of more effective and robust 
CSR within the petroleum industry.   
 
1.4 Organization of the thesis 
Chapter 1: Introduction and an explanation of the thesis and the problems of petroleum 
extraction and CSR. 
Chapter 2: A literature review of the concepts and theories, their definition and an 
explanation of them. 
Chapter 3: A review of CSR and the relevance and responsibility of corporations in 
institution building 
Chapter 4: An explanation of micro-level CSR, its uses and limitations, and how it 
pertains to the problems faced by petroleum exporting nations. 
Chapter 5: An assessment of current ideas on macro-level CSR, the potential problems 
facing its implementation and effectiveness, and the appropriateness of its application 
to the petroleum industry. 
 Chapter 6: An examination of the implementation of macro-level CSR by BP in 
Azerbaijan as an illustration of the theories and concepts previously examined. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion, policy recommendations and potential areas for further 
research. 
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1.5 The need for CSR within the petroleum industry 
As stated above, petroleum has become a greater problem in regard to conflict in the 
world and resources have often been seen as a curse rather than a benefit.   Countries 
possessing such resources often perform more poorly in terms of government, society 
and the economy than other countries that do not possess such riches.  Resources can 
be used to greatly increase the living standards of the population of a country, but this 
result has been primarily limited to cases where petroleum resources exist in countries 
having good governance and where the revenues are used to benefit the population as a 
whole.   The problems occur where oil revenues are not managed and invested 
properly to make a difference in the lives of the people and to prevent the revenue 
inflows from disrupting the economy.  It is essential that petroleum companies 
understand the potential adverse effects that petroleum revenues can have on 
governments and economies in order know how to devise CSR initiatives designed to 
improve governance and economic performance.   
The petroleum industry has largely accepted the need for CSR, but there has been a 
divergence in perspective concerning the roles of CSR.  Many companies are focusing 
specifically on micro-level projects addressing local problems while others like BP 
and Shell have attempted larger macro-level projects to try to address systemic 
problems.   One of the fundamental difficulties within CSR for the petroleum industry 
is that there is little acceptance of the concept of the “resource curse”.  For the most 
part, the industry still believes that resources are primarily a benefit to countries and 
do not constitute a potential threat to the economy and government of a country.  A 
further understanding of the effects that resources have on an economy and a country 
as a whole is needed by the industry in order to create more sound and robust CSR 
strategies. 
Macro-level effects from the exploitation of resource wealth have been well 
documented.  The problems affect both the governments and economies of resource 
rich countries, leaving the people of such countries worse off than their poorer 
counterparts.  The governmental problems include corruption and the failure to 
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institute sound policies and develop properly functioning institutions.  This may occur 
because the large amount of resource revenues may create a “rentier state” mentality 
where the government receives so much revenue from the exploitation of resources 
that it is no longer dependent upon tax revenues from its people.  Since the 
government can finance itself and maintain its power through royalties, export taxes or 
direct revenue from resource extraction, it is no longer dependent upon, and therefore 
no longer accountable to the people for its actions. 
Lewin Ross (2009) revised his claims that that oil exports have a negative effect on 
democracy within the developing world.  He now argues that position with a caveat: 
Despite flaws in the earlier analysis, and many challenges from other scholars, there is strong 
evidence that oil wealth tends to prolong authoritarian rule. But there are also intriguing 
anomalies: the undemocratic effects of oil seem to have grown over time, and to have no 
impact in Latin America… (Ross 25: 2009) 
This seems counterintuitive in the view of the often made claim that rising incomes 
should increase demand for democracy.  However, Kevin Morrison (2009) found that 
existing governments, whether democratic or autocratic, were reinforced by oil 
revenues. This means that such revenues can be detrimental to a move towards better 
and more representative government where it does not already exist.  This is in 
addition to the documented cases of the increase of conflict within resource rich 
nations.  
The economic effects of resource wealth are also well understood, but often ignored by 
CSR within the petroleum industry.  “Dutch disease” refers to the economic problems 
that Holland suffered in the 1960’s due to their exploitation of natural gas discoveries.  
These include high levels of inflation and stagnation of non-resource based economic 
sectors.  This latter effect causes economic hardship when resource wealth is 
exhausted and leaves behind an uncompetitive economy with undeveloped human 
capital and manufacturing industries.  Too great a dependence upon resource revenues 
can also result in “boom or bust” economies resulting from the price volatility of the 
resource or its depletion. 
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1.6 Evolving CSR Approaches  
Petroleum companies have engaged in various CSR activities in an attempt to help 
prevent or ameliorate the problems associated with their activities in developing 
countries. While petroleum companies initially focused on micro-level CSR as a 
means of aiding local communities through the development of educational and health 
facilities, in recent years there has been more emphasis on macro-level CSR activities 
aimed at addressing the broader, systemic problems associated with petroleum 
extraction in developing countries.  On an international scale, the creation of the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has been a step toward limiting 
corruption by bringing about greater transparency to the receipt of revenues by 
countries, although it does not require disclosure of how those revenues are spent.  
Azerbaijan is the best example of this new emphasis on macro-level CSR because BP 
has implemented the most extensive macro-level CSR program in the world.  
Azerbaijan also shows the intricacies and difficulties in creating a CSR program 
tailored to the needs of the host country.  Each country faces a unique set of problems 
that must be understood and addressed within the context of the country’s history, 
government, economy and geopolitical situation. While many of the problems endemic 
to resource based economies still exist within Azerbaijan, the relationship between and 
Azerbaijan does represent a new paradigm in CSR and indicates a possible way 
forward in the evolution of CSR within the petroleum industry.  Companies and 
governments must do more to mitigate the effects of petroleum revenues, and the 
relationship between Azerbaijan and BP can be instructive in the creation of broader 
more effective CSR initiatives.  
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2 Theories concerning the 
exploitation of natural resources  
The fact that petroleum export driven economies can experience lower economic 
growth than other countries has been well documented by earlier studies (see 
Rodriguez and Sachs (1999), Gylfason et al. (1999), and Bulte et al. (2005) Gylfason 
(2001) Sturm et. al (2009)). (Some methodological errors with these studies have been 
pointed out by Leong (2010). 
Real GDP growth of oil-exporting countries has been below levels in emerging market 
economies, except at times of relatively high oil prices, such as in the early 1980s, following 
the second oil shock of 1979, in 1990/1991, due to a spike in oil prices resulting from the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, and since the beginning of this decade, mainly as a result of surging 
demand for oil from emerging market economies. Even at such times their growth rates have 
barely matched and hardly ever exceeded those of emerging market economies. Average real 
GDP growth since 1981 was 2.6% p.a., compared with 4.2% in emerging market economies, 
confirming evidence that natural resource-rich countries tend to grow at a slower pace than 
countries endowed with fewer or no natural resources. This is known as the “resource curse”. 
Economic growth has also been more volatile than in emerging market economies in general 
(Michael Sturm, François Gurtner and Juan Gonzalez Alegre 2009). 
 
Until recently, the “resource curse” theory has been widely accepted as describing the 
causes of these problems, and a majority of earlier studies have shown the existence of 
a correlation between the exploitation of resources and poor economic performance in 
developing countries.  But more recent studies have cast doubt on this.  The more 
recent studies have shown that the abundance of resources itself leads to positive 
growth and that the poor economic performance of resource rich countries can be 
attributed to other factors rather than merely to the abundance of resources.  While the 
debate over the quantitative data continues, the problems connected with resource 
dependence, whatever their causes, can still be mitigated by CSR. 
This thesis will point out how petroleum revenues can significantly distort the 
economies of oil producing countries and show that effective macro-level CSR 
initiatives can help ameliorate these problems and turn resources into a blessing. 
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2.1 The resource curse and competing theories 
The “resource curse” theory generally seeks to explain the paradox of why countries 
that are rich in natural resources often do worse, in terms of democracy, governmental 
corruption, the economy and development, than their regional counterparts that do not 
have such extensive resource wealth.   
The theory is based upon several hypotheses: 
(1) Revenues from the extraction and sale of the resources may create an even greater 
possibility for corruption as those in control of the government and economy siphon 
off even greater portions of the national wealth for themselves, (Sturm, et. al 2009). 
(2) It may create “rentier states” or states that are not dependent on tax revenues and 
thus less accountable to their people, because the government does not depend upon 
taxes for major support, (Ross 2009) 
 (3) Investment in the resource sector at the expense of other sectors which could 
sustain the economy after the resources have been depleted, (Sturm, et. al 2009) 
(4)  Revenue inflows cause the Dutch disease which posits that the influx of resource 
export revenues will cause the country’s currency to appreciate and make it more 
difficult for it to sell its manufactured and other goods abroad, (Sturm, et. al 2009) 
(5) It may make the economy susceptible to the effects of volatile commodity prices 
and create a “boom, or bust” economy, (Cavalcanti et al. 2011c) 
(6) It can exacerbate conflict as different groups seek to seize the increased revenues 
for themselves through armed conflict. (Collier 2000) 
(7) Large amounts of income make countries complacent and they fail to plan 
adequately for a future where there are not revenues from petroleum. (Gylfason 2001) 
The European Central Bank lists the primary contributing factors for the resource 
curse:  “There are four main explanations of the resource curse: the Dutch disease 
hypothesis; reduced incentives to develop the non-resource part of the economy; high 
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volatility of resource revenues; and political economy effects of resource income, in 
particular with regard to institutional quality,” (Sturm, et. al 2009). 
Recent studies critical of the recourse curse theory have argued against this view: 
The correlation between resource dependence and slow growth and conflict, therefore, does not 
imply causation from the former to the latter. Instead, causality appears to be running from 
weak institutions and conflict to resource extraction as the default sector, which produces 
resource dependence as the final outcome. Resource dependence appears as a symptom, rather 
than a cause of underdevelopment. (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 617: 2008) 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte argue that if one considers resource abundance as opposed 
to resource scarcity in the economy, one finds positive growth in resource rich 
countries over countries that lack recourses.  They go on to argue that it is weak 
government and civil strife that causes a dependence on resources for supporting the 
economy as other forms of industry are driven away by conflict while natural 
resources are geographically linked to a territory and therefore much less likely to be 
abandoned due to conflict.   Weishu Leonga et. al , infra, in his study also found that 
resources can be a blessing provided institutions are effective and efficient.   
While the new studies of quantitative data have cast doubt on certain aspects of the 
resource curse theory (i.e., the abundance of resources itself) as the cause for poor 
economic performance, they also confirm that the volatility of resource prices has a 
negative effect on economic growth.  All studies have argued that lack of good 
governance and institutions negatively impact potentially good outcomes. 
[T]he recent empirical literature seems to provide evidence against the conventional resource 
curse literature and argues for the positive effect of resource abundance on development and 
growth, see for instance Arezki and van der Ploeg (2007), Cavalcanti et al. (2011a), and 
Esfahani et al. (2009). Moreover, while Cavalcanti et al. (2011c) and van der Ploeg and 
Poelhekke (2010) show a direct positive effect of resource abundance on growth, they provide 
evidence for the negative relationship between resource volatility and growth. Cavalcanti et al. 
(2011c) also demonstrate that volatility exerts a negative impact on economic growth operating 
mainly through lower accumulation of physical capital.  
Several recent empirical works have also focused on the mitigating role of institutions. Using a 
cross-sectional approach, Mehlum et al. (2006) and Béland and Tiagi (2009) show that the 
impact of natural resources on growth and development depends primarily on institutions, 
while Boschini et al. (2007) illustrate that the type of natural resources possessed is also an 
important factor. These authors argue that when controlling for institutional quality, and 
including an interaction term between institutional quality and resource abundance, a threshold 
effect arises. Therefore there are levels of institutional quality above which resource abundance 
becomes growth enhancing, (Leong 3: 2011). 
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For the purposes of this paper, however, causation has little importance though it 
appears that a bulk of the literature is moving away from the traditional concept of the 
“resource curse”.  Ultimately, it does not matter whether or not the abundance of 
resources has created dependency on those resources because their tremendous 
profitability distorts the economy or whether the existence of poor governance and 
civil conflict within the region have created that reliance upon resource revenue 
because capital has fled from all other industries from which it could be withdrawn.  
Both theories conclude that the creation of diversified economies with functioning 
governmental institutions are required to move beyond strictly resource dependent 
economies.  The mitigating factors in assuring growth remain consistent throughout all 
of the studies, and those factors are effective governance, properly functioning 
institutions and economic diversification.   
 
2.2 “Dutch disease” 
The condition known as “Dutch disease” was hypothesized by W. Max Corden and J. 
Peter Neary in a 1982 paper and refers to large scale changes in investment and 
resource allocation.  It gets its name from problems that Holland faced in the 1960’s 
when large amounts of natural gas were found.  The most notable change in the 
economy is the shift away from investment in manufacturing and the production of 
other tradable goods into the resource sector and non-tradable services.  The 
exploitation of natural resources produces large amounts of revenue that can distort 
traditional economies and currency exchange rates.  “Dutch disease” is still seen as a 
threat to good performance by resource rich countries, although there are mitigating 
factors that can help countries avoid it. 
“Dutch disease” effects the economy in the following way.  The rapid inflow of money 
into the country to invest in the petroleum sector produces inflation.  The increase in 
investment in the petroleum sector creates increased demand for a country’s currency, 
which causes it to appreciate against other currencies.  The other sectors of the 
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economy, which could provide more employment, are hurt in several ways: (1) There 
is a lack of investment in manufacturing and other sectors because the oil sector is far 
more profitable; (2) The service sector booms due to the increased demand coming 
from the resource sector and this pulls labor away from other sectors, which have 
difficulty competing with the rising wages; (3) Manufacturing is hurt by rising 
inflation rates in the country, which make manufactured goods more expensive to 
produce; (4) As a result in the appreciation in the country’s currency, manufacturing 
and other industries become less competitive in selling their products internationally 
and exports decline.  If the petroleum resource is depleted or prices drop, other sectors 
of the economy, which have been neglected in favor of the resource sector, are unable 
to pick up the slack in the economy caused by the decline in petroleum revenue.                                                                    
There are ways, however, to ameliorate the effects of the “Dutch disease”.  Generally 
these solutions are seen as macro in nature.  A new quantitative study by Cosimo 
Beverelli, Salvatore Dell’Erba and Nadia Rocha has reaffirmed the quantitative 
existence of the “Dutch disease”.   They found that “Countries that export the overall 
amount of natural resources extracted are more at risk from suffering from Dutch 
disease than countries consuming such resources domestically,” (Beverelli et al. 
2011:150).  Beverelli et al. hypothesize that the creation of a domestic manufacturing 
industry that is centered around the abundant resource is crucial to escaping the Dutch 
disease.  In the case of oil, this can be oil refining or manufacturing industries, such as 
chemical plants, that have a relative advantage because they use the abundant resource 
heavily in production.  Thus, diversification and broad growth in all sectors of the 
economy is critical for preventing the “Dutch disease”. 
Another way that pressures from the inflow of resource revenue can be managed is by 
creating sovereign wealth funds to manage the resource revenues.  Norway’s sovereign 
wealth fund has attempted to mitigate the inflationary pressures from having a huge 
amount of oil wealth pumped into the country’s economy by stipulating that such 
funds cannot be invested inside Norway.  This has had the effect of limiting 
inflationary pressures within the country and, by limiting the demand for its currency 
internationally, has prevented it from appreciating greatly against other currencies.  
12 
 
Sound and transparent management is critical for the proper functioning of the 
sovereign wealth funds.  Without this, the large investment funds can be misused to 
plug temporary holes in governmental budgets or go to finance corrupt activities.  If 
the funds are misused in this way, the sovereign wealth funds will not serve their 
purposes and cannot be effective in avoiding the potential economic and political 
damage of vastly increased revenue inflows.  Within the area of sovereign wealth 
funds, CSR has been used to effectively help and maintain sound economic planning.   
 
2.3 Rentier States 
The term ‘rentier state’ as defined by Donald Loseman refers to “a country that garners 
a substantial portion of its income from external sources, most generally from the sales 
of resources such as oil and gas... Importantly, the label “rentier state” requires that 
governments (or their agencies) be the direct recipients of these external rents” (428: 
2010).  Economic dependence on outside income has traditionally meant “rent” is paid 
for land or resources without improvement or investment in the land (Loseman, 2010).  
The country is not necessarily improved by such a transaction.  Coupled with the fact 
that governments become less dependent on their people for tax revenues, this can be 
very detrimental to the establishment or maintenance of governmental institutions.  
First, it can cause governments to refrain from setting up efficient means of collecting 
taxes, as is the case in Azerbaijan.  This, ultimately, will be extremely harmful to the 
government, because when oil revenues dry up, the government will have little means 
to fund itself through tax collection.  Second, it will mean that governments will be 
less accountable to their people, since the government receives little revenue from 
them.  The government also has less incentive to ensure their population’s economic 
growth as the government is not dependent on the increase in tax revenues. Conversely 
the population has fewer expectations from the government because they do not fund 
it.  The government and the people become insulated from each other because they are 
not interconnected through revenue collection. 
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Kevin Morrison found that “nontax revenue should be associated with less taxation of 
elites in democracies, more social spending in dictatorships, and more stability for 
both regime types,” (2009 : 1).  This increase in regime stability has a potentially 
detrimental effect on the establishment of democracy within undemocratic states.  
While increased social spending can mollify populations of autocratic regimes and 
thus support the existing regime, this social expenditure is not sustainable and does not 
offer hope for permanently bettering the lives of peoples within the state.  Investment 
in the population must be done in ways that diversify and develop the economy to 
provide long-term, sustainable employment rather than merely temporarily pacifying 
the population with handouts.  The cutting of taxes in democracies also damages 
governments and institutions as they become more dependent on revenues from 
resources to plug gaps in their tax proceeds.  Since tax cuts usually go to aid the rich, 
this has little effect on growing the economy, but rather constitutes a means of aiding 
elite groups to the detriment of the economy as a whole.  It should be noted that 
Norway, a country that has successfully administered its petroleum wealth, has 
resisted the urge to cut taxes, and by maintaining a large tax base it has reduced its 
dependence on resource revenues.  Within democratic countries the need to resist 
creating windfall tax policies is crucial to the maintenance of sound governance.   
Rent-seeking behavior in countries can be extremely damaging to their economies.   
Successful economic development and diversification creates a reduction in rent that 
governments receive from the export of natural resources because of the increase in 
domestic consumption of those resources.  Since economic development means an 
increased internal usage of oil, it has the effect of reducing the amount of money the 
government receives from oil exports, thus creating a governmental disincentive for 
economic development. (Al-Ubaydli 2009) 
Restructuring local economies to move away from rent-seeking behavior is crucial for 
the economic development of a nation and the survival of functioning governmental 
institutions.  Omar Al-Ubaydli argues that, democracies are not as motivated to limit 
economic growth because there is a potential for election losses if this is done, but 
limiting economic growth can be potentially beneficial to those in power in 
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authoritarian states.  This is because as economies grow they demand more resources 
and the external rents paid to governments are reduced, thus leaving governments 
worse off than they were before there was economic growth.  It is therefore crucial to 
populations that live in authoritarian states that their governments move away from the 
rentier state system and implement broad tax reform that will allow for a transition 
from rent-seeking to taxation as the major source of revenue as the economy grows 
and export revenues decline.   
Rentier states have also been shown to have a different relationship with their 
population in regards to civil liberties and civil rights.  A 2011 study by Rabah Arezki 
found that: 
[W]ithin-country increases in oil rents lead to significant within-country increases in 
corruption, significant within-country decreases in political rights, as well as significant within-
country increases in civil liberties. On the other hand, we find that on average within-country 
increases in oil rents did not have a significant overall effect on the risk of civil conflict. 
(Rabah Arezki 17: 2009)  
While civil liberties were increased because a crack down on dissent was not 
necessary to maintain regime stability, there was a decrease in political rights because 
government stability was shored up though external revenues.  This has clear 
ramifications for good governance as governments face less pressure to reform their 
practices as long as the population can be bought off.   
If rent-seeking governments use the resource revenue to buy off the population until 
such time as they can no longer do so because resource revenue has decreased, there 
will be insufficient time and resources to significantly alter the economy and tax 
structure in order to bring about broad economic growth in the future.     
 
2.4 The importance of Good Governance  
Good Governance is defined by the UN as having 8 characteristics. “It is participatory, 
consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, 
equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law,” (UN website a).  
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Good governance is one of the crucial factors in controlling problems associated with 
resource exploitation.  Well-established democracies with functioning institutions have 
had a good ability to deal with resource wealth and have not seen a substantial 
weakening of democratic institutions due to the influx of wealth and have been better 
able to weather resource volatility.  
The creation of governments that follow the principles of good governance is essential 
for the effective management of resource revenue and the economy.  At the same time, 
the sudden wealth created by resource development may have the direct effect of 
lessening good governance, so external expertise and assistance is crucial in assuring 
“good governance” in countries where it is not already well established.  According to 
work done by Sambit Bhattacharyyaa, and Roland Hodler (2010), the increased 
corruption experienced by countries with high levels of natural resource wealth is 
correlated with the quality of their democratic institutions.  Their “game-theoretic 
model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the 
democratic institutions is relatively poor, but not otherwise,” (1: 2011).  
Good governance is in fact the most crucial element of insuring that resources are used 
effectively to aid economic growth and development of a country for the benefit of its 
entire population. This has been clearly postulated since “The ‘resource curse’ is 
primarily a political and not an economic phenomenon,” (Karl, 256: 2009).   
 
2.5 Reliance upon petroleum revenues and 
democracy 
Some quantitative studies have found that oil exports have a statistically significant 
negative effect on democracy within the developing world.   
Among the petrostates, successful transitions to democracy are rare.  Venezuela’s 1958 
transition is at the top of the list. The next four leading producers to democratize were Russia 
(1991), Nigeria (1979), Ecuador (1979) and the Congo Republic (1992); but all of these 
transitions were later reversed. This highlights the unusual quality of Venezuela’s success: 
since Venezuela’s 1958 transition, no country with more oil income than Mexico in 2000 has 
become sustainably democratic. 
16 
 
One result of this pattern is that since the early 1980s, oil states have made up a growing 
fraction of the world’s remaining authoritarian states. In 1982, long-term oil producers made 
up about 22 percent (27 of 122) of the world’s autocracies; by 2002, this same group of oil 
producers made up about 34 percent (24 of 71) of the remaining autocratic states. For 
democracy advocates, the effects of oil have become increasingly salient. (Ross 6: 2009).   
 
This means that petroleum wealth, far from raising people from poverty and giving 
them the desire and ability to have a greater say in their governments, might often have 
the opposite effect.  However; again some new research casts doubt on oil hindering 
democracy.  New studies argue that prior research has mistaken correlation with 
causation.  Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo find in their 2011 study that reliance 
upon petroleum resources does not necessarily create anti-democratic conditions over 
the long term: 
Our results indicate that oil and mineral reliance does not promote dictatorship over the long 
run. If anything, the opposite is true. These results hold even when we search for a host of 
conditional effects suggested by the literature. This is not to say that there may not be specific 
instances in which resource rents might have helped to sustain a dictatorship. It is to say, 
however, that there is a big difference between pointing to these instances and making 
sweeping, law-like statements, (Haber and Menaldo 25: 2011). 
 
Recent work is making scholars re-examine previous assumptions about the role of 
resources within countries.  However, it must be pointed out that the recent studies 
have been anything but consistent in how and if democracy is promoted.  Cesari 
(2011), also, finds a negative correlation between democracy and oil resources in the 
quality of institutions.  So while it is possible that oil in the aggregate might promote 
democracy itself, that is not to say that it will strengthen such institutions there are also 
difference in regions that should be controlled for, Ross (2009) found that with the 
exception of Latin America there was not a sustained move towards democracies in 
the oil exporting world:   
An important study by Dunning [2008] shows that Latin America seems to be unaffected by 
the anti-democratic powers of petroleum… [Of] the ten top oil producers that have transited to 
democracy since 1950. All of the countries that made successful transits were in Latin 
America: Venezuela (1958), Mexico (2000), Argentina (1983), and Bolivia (1982). 
Conversely, all of Latin America’s oil producers (like almost all of its non-oil producers) are 
now democracies. In fact, Latin America’s long-term oil producers (Argentina, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Trinidad, and Venezuela) have generally been more democratic than its non-oil 
producers, although today there is little difference…  [O]il-rich autocracies were more likely to 
democratize in Latin America, but less likely to democratize in the rest of the world. (Ross 8: 
2009) 
 
Almost all studies have shown that democratic governments and institutions are vital 
in limiting corruption and rent-seeking behavior.   
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When natural resources are plentiful, dictators have a guaranteed income and can afford to 
hamstring the economy to maintain their grip on power. Conversely, when natural resources 
are limited, the cost of repressing associational freedom is high and so dictators have to balance 
their desire for longevity with their desire for wealth. 
 
In democracies, on the other hand, the pressure of the electoral process does not give 
politicians an incentive to repress the economy. The result is that natural resources damage 
development and democratization in authoritarian regimes, but not in democracies. I test these 
predictions using an international panel from 1975 to 2000 and find support for the model, (Al-
Ubaydli 3: 2010). 
 
This is a critical understanding for the proper design and implementation of CSR 
programs. Without the implementation of effective policies to counteract the negative 
effect on civil liberties and the economy, the existence of petroleum resources may 
produce poorer and less democratic governance.  
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3 The Role CSR in Government  
There is no one accepted definition of CSR, but an analytical paper by Alexander 
Dahlsrud found that of the 37 common definitions, the “definitions are to a large 
degree congruent”.  The definition by the Commission of the European Communities 
is the most common definition found on the internet and is broad enough to give a 
general sense and encompass the ideas traditionally associated with CSR - a 
company’s voluntary undertaking to aid stakeholders and mitigating costs that are 
externalized to the community.  The CEC defines CSR as “A concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations 
and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis,” (Dahlsrad 7: 
2006).  For the purposes of this paper, it is also necessary to understand that CSR also 
has a developmental component to it that is common through many of the definitions.  
Essentially, CSR is corporate action for the betterment of society.   
 
3.1 CSR is a voluntary undertaking by a company 
CSR is voluntary action that a company takes in order to aid the “stakeholders”, or 
those directly affected by the company’s actions.  This action is above and beyond 
what is legally required  and is therefore often associated with occurring because of 
outside pressure from stakeholder groups, other NGO’s, or governments that use 
publicity in order to induce firms to either to change their behavior to avoid directly 
hurting communities or to aid in the development of communities.  Since CSR is a 
voluntary undertaking, it must be consistent with the self interests of a company.  A 
corporation’s primary motive remains the making of a profit for its shareholders, and 
while CSR has been so ingrained in the western business model that it is now an 
assumed part of a business model (Bondy et. al.), the primary object of a corporation is 
not social change.  In order for a corporation to engage in CSR, it must believe that its 
activities in some way promote its own self interests.  Thus, it is important to realize 
that, when advocating for an expanded role of corporations in the betterment of 
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society, there are profit motive constraints on corporations’ CSR activities.  Corporate 
assistance in building schools and hospitals cannot be seen as a purely altruistic 
undertaking, since the incentive may be to decrease unrest or dissatisfaction in a local 
area in order to make corporate operations safer and more efficient or to enhance their 
ability to hire employees. 
While it has been argued that CSR in and of itself can make a company more 
competitive and profitable, this has not been conclusively shown.  Bryan Husted and 
David Allen found that the academic study of CSR and profitability has yielded mixed 
results, because of the complexity of company profits: “financial performance comes 
at the end of a long chain of mediating and independent variables.  In other words, too 
many variables influence firm financial performance for us to isolate effectively the 
impact of CSR activities,” (595: 2007).   While objectively proving the returns of CSR 
to companies is well outside the scope of this paper, it is an important limitation on 
corporations’ CSR efforts.   
The complexities of economies, governments and peoples that are affected by CSR 
initiatives have also made drawing firm conclusions about “effective” CSR policies 
difficult.  Academic study has not produced a blue print of successful CSR (Husted 
and Allen 2007).  This lack of a clear blueprint contributes to the difficulty in creating 
a single specific definition of CSR, because each situation where CSR is applied is 
case specific to a company, a region and those affected by the company. 
Michael Blowfeld criticizes modern CSR in the following way: 
CSR has established an orthodoxy that has gone largely unnoticed by other disciplines despite 
the way it is shaping the private sector’s relationship with the rest of society at national, 
international and global levels. This orthodoxy is at the root of contemporary CSR’s failure 
because the discipline has yet to develop the means for internal critique, and as a result is 
unable to recognise its own assumptions, prejudices and limitations. (173: 2005) 
 
Blowfeld’s criticism of CSR shows the need for improvement in both the number and 
rigor of studies of CSR.  While the role of CSR and its merits need to be rigorously 
challenged, corporations’ role as “social actors” also must be defined.  International 
corporations can exert tremendous influence and power in shaping policy, but their 
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accountability and justification as social actors is far less clear than their ability to 
effect change.  
 
3.2 The relationship between CSR and the legal 
system 
CSR is not a substitute for a country’s laws and regulations, however it can 
supplement them.  For example, CSR can render assistance in areas where the 
government does not have a robust presence.  There is some reason to believe that 
CSR might aid in the creation of such laws, in that “’firms’ voluntary efforts 
contribute to the intangible resources that will, in any case, be necessary to support any 
binding rules that may emerge,” (Gordon 13: 2000). 
CSR does have a place in regulating activity; “Public suspicions of voluntary efforts 
undertaken by businesses and NGOs may be based on a somewhat unrealistic view of 
the alternative -- public regulation. No system of social control of companies is perfect 
and many, including a large number of public schemes, are highly imperfect,” (Gordon 
13: 2000).   
She goes on to say that: 
As the business community itself often points out, these voluntary efforts can only be, at best, a 
highly imperfect substitute for a uniform, appropriate policy framework supported them -- 
there is a need to reap the benefits of synergies between voluntary and binding approaches.  
Such a framework would have to include not just international standards, but also supporting 
domestic institutions (e.g. school systems, public sector reforms, better corporate governance 
systems, and improved enforcement capacity), (14: 2000). 
 
It can also be argued the other way around, that effective and dynamic legal 
obligations can help CSR.  
Regarding the sometimes complex differentiation and complementation of soft- and hardlaw, 
the present article has also emphasised that, although there is a wide consensus that CSR 
activities are, by definition, voluntary and CSR policies soft in character, this does not mean 
that governments cannot (co-)develop binding minimum standards and quality assuring 
procedures for issues currently being discussed under the heading of CSR. There are two 
reasons for this. First, the CSR minimum standards may only be binding for those who apply 
them voluntarily; and second, if they become new mandatory legal standards for all, CSR 
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policies will simply be turned into conventional social or environmental hard-law regulations 
(for examples of this, see Rasche et al. 2008). According to an EU research project on the 
‘Rhetoric and Realities in CSR’, conventional social and environmental regulations not only 
curtail the scope of voluntary CSR but also provide crucial points of orientation: ‘companies 
proved more active with regard to voluntary sustainability activities when ambitious policies 
provided clear points of orientation’ (Barth et al. 2007, p. 34). (Steurer 16: 2010) 
 
CSR cannot be viewed as an alternative to effective laws and regulation, but needs to 
be viewed in a complementary light.  The activities of a corporation which are in 
compliance with or not prohibited by the law can still have a detrimental effect on the 
lives of people and thus CSR might be necessary to go beyond the current legal 
standard.  
As the above passage points out legal standards can give companies a starting point 
and direction for their CSR operations.  CSR by itself cannot take the place of 
government regulation in setting minimum standards of acceptable behavior, but it can 
point in the direction of better policies for the government to adopt.  In this way, CSR 
can have the effect of helping to improve the quality of governmental policies and 
practices.  
 
3.3 Corporate moral responsibility within CSR 
While generally it is seen as the obligation of companies to deal with the direct effects 
of their actions, such as paying for environmental damages or damage to property 
caused by the company, there has been less of a demand by the public that companies 
mitigate the indirect effects of their business activities.  For example, the firearm 
industry is not generally seen as being responsible for acts of violence involving the 
firearms which they manufacture and sell.  CSR goes beyond the type of thinking that 
companies have only the moral responsibility to correct the negative effects of their 
actions or to avoid activities which are harmful.  CSR initiatives often demonstrate a 
company undertaking a positive moral responsibility to ameliorate conditions within 
society.  In his examination of the moral basis of CSR, Claus S. Frederiksen found that 
it was most often based in what he termed “common-sense” morality:  
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Supporters of common-sense morality believe in the existence of both negative rights and 
positive duties. In relation to CSR, supporters of the common-sense orientation believe that 
companies have a moral obligation not to violate anyone’s rights and that they also have 
positive duties towards certain groups, such as employees, the local community and others 
closely related to the company, (359: 2010). 
 
It is easy to see how this ethic fits in well with what is found in most CSR campaigns.  
As I will discuss in later sections, CSR has gone well beyond negative rights - that is 
well beyond the principle of “do no harm”- and has moved into positive rights, like 
building schools and health clinics. 
When dealing with industrial operations that threaten to distort whole economies, the 
stakeholders have a right not to have their livelihoods and economy disrupted or their 
governmental institutions corrupted as a result of resource development.  While the 
extractive industry may not be the direct cause of government corruption or misspent 
revenues, it is a foreseeable and understandable byproduct of the companies’ 
payments.   Thus, from a negative moral perspective (people’s freedom from harm) 
such corporations have a moral obligation to assure that they do not facilitate 
governments in violating the rights of the stakeholders.   
Stakeholders also have positive rights, since it is the people of a country that “own” 
the resources, not the government.  The petroleum industry should fairly compensate 
the people for their resources.  While the government is often the one that sells or 
leases the mineral rights to the industries, the resources truly belong to the people.  
Government officials can only act legitimately as the representative of the people in 
such transactions
1
 if they are acting in the population’s interests.  If an oil company 
obtains these rights illegitimately from corrupt government officials, who are not 
acting in good faith for the benefit of the people, then the transaction is suspect.  Thus, 
the company then has a positive moral obligation to see that the resources are used for 
the benefit of those who are the true owners of the resource.   
The role and responsibilities of corporations in the area of governance is expanding.  
Although some might argue that this is outside of the proper function of corporations, 
                                                 
1
 People have to right to self-determination, and therefore must be holders of governmental power. 
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CSR seems to have adopted the “common-sense morality” approach which includes 
concern for both the positive and negative rights of a country’s population, including 
both positive and negative rights for the population.  While the intrusion of 
corporations into the area of governance has some troubling implications, the CSR 
ethic seems to be broad-based and expansive in the sense of giving corporations a lot 
of leeway in designing and implementing programs to further positive rights 
obligations.  In the later chapters, I will argue that macro-level CSR is well suited to 
promoting good governance as it works to better governance without supplanting 
government, like micro-level CSR can. 
 
3.4 The legitimacy of corporate involvement in 
matters of governance 
Corporations play an ever expanding role in international business affairs. 
Transnational Corporations, business and industry association, corporate foundations and 
wealthy business executives are playing stronger international public roles in at least three 
significant ways.  First, they are supplanting or supplementing government and multilateral 
foreign aid programs through philanthropy.  Second, they are involved in international standard 
setting and voluntary participation in self-regulation and private certification arrangements on 
social, human rights and environmental issues.  Third, they play a key role in framing and 
shaping international policies both inside and outside of the conventional processes of 
government decision making (Rondinelli 394: 2003). 
The term “Corporate Citizenship” is often used to describe a corporation’s role in 
society or, particularly its responsibilities to contribute to the betterment of society 
without reference to its own benefit.  While the term Corporate Citizenship has 
expanded in its use and there are many beneficial aspects to it, there are also legitimate 
concerns and questions as to whether the term ‘citizen’ is applicable to corporations 
since they lack some of the attributes commonly associated with ‘citizenship’.   
All political models of citizenship share the assumption that citizens stand in some sovereign 
relationship to the government and the direction of the activity of governing or ‘governance’. 
This raises immediate questions about the appropriateness of the term for corporations. We 
have seen that there are no strong grounds for applying the minimalist conception of 
citizenship to corporations as they fail the legal and political status test. They are manifestly 
not bearers of the political rights that are characteristically seen as fundamental to liberal 
citizenship (Moon, et al 17: 2003 ). 
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Even though there are many ramifications of corporations’ legitimate or illegitimate 
role in influencing government, D. A. Rondinelli concludes that their influence is here 
to stay and will further expand.  This influence may help or hinder good governance.  
Historically, corporations have attempted to influence governments to increase their 
profits (such as decreased regulation or taxation or to obtain government contracts).  
Lobbying and pursuing their political interests is an active part of corporations’ 
business strategy.  What is changing now is that corporations are being asked to assist 
governments and to contribute to society in ways that do not directly improve their 
profits.   
Since CSR is seen primary as a public relations tool for corporations, there is reason to 
believe that corporations’ role within society where it does not have a vested corporate 
interest might be less harmful than its more traditional role of influencing governments 
in ways designed increase their profitability.   It also should be noted that it has 
primarily been pressure from NGOs that has pushed companies to expand their CSR 
activities and move outside of traditional business practices.  An expanded role of 
corporations into humanitarian activities and institution building is often sought by 
corporate accountability movements, thus negating some of the objections to such 
actions (Rondinelli 2003).  
Corporations generally have not been eager to expand their role in government beyond 
their narrowly defined self-interest within the realm of CSR.  “American corporations 
have been keen on getting involved in various development initiatives in education and 
health, but ‘for instance, we couldn’t get companies involved in party-building 
activities in Zambia’. In the words of one interviewed oil company manager, ‘we 
cannot be government,’” (Fryas 165: 2010).  Petroleum corporations, in particular, 
have been reluctant to become involved in governance issues. 
Most oil company executives tend to reject the notion that they could play a constructive role 
in helping to address governance failures and they have a legitimate concern over corporate 
involvement in the political process. However, such a stance denies the reality that (1) 
multinational companies already intervene in the political process to attain corporate objectives 
(e.g. lobbying for new legislation) (Frynas et al., 2006; Shaffer and Hillman, 2000); (2) 
corporate activities such as tax avoidance and lobbying may be contributing to governance 
failures (Henriques, 2007; Utting, 2007) and (3) under certain circumstances, multinational 
companies may benefit commercially from governance failures in developing countries (e.g. 
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non-enforcement of certain government regulations or the ability of companies to negotiate 
more profitable agreements with governments) (Frynas, 1998; Frynas and Mellahi, 2003). 
(Frynas 174: 2010) 
However, there still remain some issues with respect to the legitimacy and 
appropriateness of corporate CSR activities in the area of governance.   After all, 
petroleum companies were never designed to be governments or impartial advisors to 
governments.  They are private organizations designed to make a profit for their 
shareholders and are not subject to scrutiny in the way that governments are.  While 
there should be concerns about corporate involvement in governance, they do have the 
experience and ability to contribute to good governance in constructive way.   
 
3.5 Avoiding cultural imperialism in CSR 
There is some danger that Western corporations might impose “Western ideas” of 
corruption on countries that do not except them, but this can be avoided by using a 
broad definition of corruption.  The UN borrows Transparency International’s 
definition of corruption-- “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”( 
Transparency International).  Using this as a broader definition it is clear that gaining 
advantage by using means outside of the power or legitimacy of one’s public office 
can be seen as outside the scope of their power and therefore a misuse of entrusted 
power.  Societies are free to give officers more power if they wish, but unless it is 
done within confines of the law and within the limits of the office, misuse of entrusted 
power can be seen even across cultures as corruption.  
Within this context, corporations insisting on anti-corruption measures, transparency 
and “good governance” can be fully compliant with the rights of countries and 
populations to have self-determination.  According to Habermas (2001), even the 
imposition of good governance by the company can be consistent with democracy or 
self-determination as long as it further strengthens democratic systems and the right of 
self-determination.  It should therefore be understood that companies acting 
unilaterally need not be a hindrance to democracy, whereas democracy itself can 
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violate its own axioms and become undemocratic.  While people need to maintain the 
right to self-determination, neither the companies nor the people themselves can 
choose to violate that right, and still be deemed democratic or in compliance with the 
right of the people to self-determination.  While it can be considered circular logic that 
outside companies and people impose democracy and good governance, the imposed 
structure is still democratic and consistent with good governance as long as it does not 
violate fundamental rights of democracy and good governance.  The imposition of 
reforms by outside groups, corporate CSR activities in this case, need not be 
undemocratic or as undermine the concept of self determination.  
Where questions of legitimacy are concerned some of the issues can be solved by 
involving international organizations and NGOs in the process.  With the 
comprehensive peace building approach, the UN works with both governments and 
other development organizations.     
The UN’s integrated approach concept should thus be understood in a wider international 
context where coherence is pursued at the national level among government departments 
(whole-of-government), and internationally among donors (harmonization); between donor 
and recipients (alignment); within the UN development, humanitarian and environment 
dimensions (system-wide coherence); and among the peace, security, human rights, 
humanitarian and development dimensions of the UN system at country level (integrated 
approach and integrated missions). (Cedric de Coning 6: 2009). 
 
BP has involved the UN, specifically the UNDP, in its plans to aid in poverty 
elimination in Nigeria.  Not only does this approach bring together a greater variety of 
expertise, but the involvement of various organizations means that they can act as a 
check upon each other.  Together they can all have input and a greater ability to effect 
governmental change, and also have a greater legitimacy because the role of the UN 
and other international organizations is to foster good governance and development.   
It is necessary to have the UN and other international aid and development 
organizations integrated further into the processes so that the legitimacy and the merits 
of the proffered advice can be scrutinized.  Having such organizations involved and 
attending meetings brings a needed transparency to assure the legitimacy of the 
process.  While programs like the EITI ++ (discussed in Chapter 4) will add 
organizations like the World Bank into planning and the managing of money, it is less 
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clear how integrated they will be with the companies themselves.  Moreover, the 
participation of the IMF and World Bank are also open to question since their roles are 
often seen as benefitting banks and other lenders at the expense of the population.  The 
involvement of the UN and other international aid and development organizations 
would not have this disadvantage, since their only motive would be to benefit the 
people.   
While the comprehensive approach does have its drawbacks since adding another 
agency and another bureaucracy to the mix can delay action and add to the costs, it 
would give some assurance that the macro-level CSR activities of corporations are 
actually doing what they are supposed to do, that is to help to create better governance 
and stronger institutions. 
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4 The uses and limitations of micro-
level CSR initiatives 
 
In this chapter I will explain the basic assumptions of and problems that exist with 
micro-level CSR and why it is particularly ill-suited for dealing with the problems 
associated with the extraction of petroleum in developing countries.  In order to 
understand the need for a macro-level approach, it is critically important to understand 
the failings of the current CSR initiatives on the micro-level.  I will explain the 
fundamental difficulties that companies face when trying to solve broad societal 
problems without taking a holistic approach and how this is especially true with 
respect to the petroleum industry.  I will also briefly discuss environmental issues as 
they can often be the most obvious and dramatic issues affecting the local community.  
While the environment in not a major point of the thesis, it can illustrate broader CSR 
principles.  Micro-level CSR may help alleviate problems in local communities, but it 
cannot deal with the broader systemic problems such as poor governance or corruption 
affecting an entire country or region.  Macro-level CSR is necessary to deal with such 
problems.   
 
4.1 What is Micro-level CSR? 
Micro-level CSR is generally what is thought of as community projects within CSR.  
Often these are touted by companies as examples of their helping a community.  
Projects often include the creation and funding of health centers, schools, clean water 
projects and the like.  What makes something micro-level is that it is working on 
smaller community problems rather than broader systemic problems, but there is not a 
hard line between micro and macro level projects.  It has been hypothesized that 
micro-level projects especially programs like funding of education, can have macro-
level effects, by improving human capital within the country and thus alleviating 
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broader societal problems and by creating economic development and diversification. 
There is some reason to doubt these claims and little evidence to support them. 
Micro-level projects developed in terms of CSR as a response to the direct impact felt 
by stakeholders from company actions. This can mean helping the community 
alleviate environmental degradation caused by the company or access to healthcare or 
education as a form of compensation for resources. 
While CSR has traditionally been an attempt by companies to better their image within 
society, community based projects are not without their controversies and detractors: 
[E]ven if some developmental benefits can be derived from CSR, CSR does not address crucial 
questions of governance. The reason why companies such as Shell in Nigeria have been asked 
to build schools and hospitals is that the government has failed in its developmental role. 
When governance fails, local people often turn to oil companies to provide development 
projects, and this phenomenon can be seen in extreme form in Nigeria, where Shell has been 
regarded by many as a quasi-government. But the development projects funded by oil 
companies are often inadequate…  And even if CSR in the oil industry were to develop best 
practices and deliver development effectively, then there would be even less pressure on 
governments in countries such as Nigeria to provide such benefits. And yet it is the 
government which tends to receive the lion’s share of oil revenues from oil companies, 
sometimes amounting to 70–80 per cent of those revenues. In other words, even the best CSR 
initiatives can access only the 20–30 per cent share of oil revenues accruing to oil companies, 
and cannot address how the remaining 70–80 per cent should be used for the country’s 
development. By implication, it is arguable that CSR may provide a lose–lose outcome for a 
country’s governance: governance failures lead to calls for a role of CSR in development; 
usually CSR is unable to play such a positive developmental role, but even if CSR could play 
such a role, this would ease the pressure on the government to undertake a developmental role 
itself, (Frynas 596: 2005). 
 
There is also a sustainability problem since companies extracting non-renewable 
resources will probably not have a long term presence in the communities.  Thus, as 
companies move on, projects and money for those projects can dry up as companies no 
longer operate in the area, and the government lacks the will or ability to sustain the 
projects.  Micro-level CSR has an inherent sustainability problem that is difficult to 
resolve without macro-level changes to the government.  
While these are legitimate criticisms, community based CSR projects might be vital 
for emergencies and as short-term aid to communities.  However, they might have a 
lasting detrimental effect in obfuscating the correct role of the government within a 
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country.   History and existing conditions will influence how CSR initiatives are 
perceived in different countries. Gjølberg states that:  
CSR is inseparable from pre-existing models of state-market-society relations.  Thus, the 
outcome of the present extensive promotion of CSR as an instrument in national and global 
governance by governments and multilateral institutions will be highly contingent upon the 
pre-existing socio-political models where CSR is introduced, (Gjølberg 223: 2010).   
Efforts must be made to assure that CSR projects are understood in their proper role.   
If the government has never provided educational or healthcare services to an area, the 
populace may not expect it to provide them.  In that situation, as the quotation by 
Frynas in the previous section states, Shell was seen as a quasi-governmental 
organization and was depended upon to build basic infrastructure and facilities in 
Nigeria. This has relieved pressure on the Nigerian government and has enabled the 
government to neglect its fundamental duties.  As community development, heath and 
education projects fall within the realm of government, micro-level CSR raises 
troubling issues as to why companies are relied upon to fill the role of providing basic 
governmental services. 
Local CSR projects, by relieving the government of the necessity to provide essential 
infrastructure and services, can create a distorted environment for governments and 
weaken or hinder the establishment of necessary governmental institutions.  In 
Nigeria, the government receives a lion’s share of the oil revenues, leaving only a 
small fraction of revenues for Shell to make profit and to fund local CSR programs, 
(Frynas 2005).  Local CSR projects might take the place of legitimate government 
projects and expenditures that are well within the role of government.   
BP has stated that it hopes that is local projects have a greater and longer impact that 
lasts after it has ceased operations in the area: 
We aim to make these programmes contribute to sustainable development, rather than end their 
beneficial impacts when BP funding ceases or we leave a location. 
The programmes we support fall into three broad categories: building business skills; 
supporting education and other community needs and sharing technical expertise with local 
governments. (BP website a) 
Some countries’ governments will not be able to fulfill all of their legitimate 
obligations, because of a lack of institutional capacity or resources.  Here companies 
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might have to step in but, this should never be a long term solution.  According to 
Kevin Morrison (2010), companies taking the place of government can have a 
detrimental effect on the government’s ability to manage its obligations, for the reason 
that the government does not need to learn how to provide basic services for its 
citizens since those obligations have been taken over by international companies.  It 
also may create a different problem - if money that would otherwise be required to be 
spent on hospitals, schools or other infrastructure is no longer required because 
companies or other organizations are providing those needs, the government has the 
ability to spend that money on less vital or perhaps detrimental areas (Feyzioglu, 
Swaroop, and Zhu 1998) like the military.   
 
4.2 Co-ordination and oversight of projects 
A problem in any environment is proper co-ordination of projects.  This can be a 
problem with development aid when projects are undertaken that either overlap or do 
not have the requisite support to succeed.  A clear example of this was in Nigeria 
where two parallel roads were built by two different aid organizations (Frynas 2005).  
Even if the proper infrastructure is built, the local community might not be able to 
utilize it to its full advantage.  For example, the government may lack the resources to 
maintain the road, or lack of capital or permit requirements for starting businesses may 
prevent it from creating economic development.  Projects that exist in a poor policy 
environment have a much greater chance of failing (World Bank 1992; Easterly 2002).  
So there is a necessity for high levels of organizational oversight and integration of 
projects.  
The greater number of projects, the greater the difficulty the government has to 
oversee them and how they fit into a broader development strategy.  The increase in 
the costs of oversight strains weak institutions (Knack and Rahman 2007).   
This study provides a formal analysis and empirical evidence suggesting that competitive 
donor practices, where there are many small donors and no dominant donor, erode 
administrative capacity in recipient country governments. In their need to show results, donors 
each act to maximize performance of their own projects, and shirk on provision of the public 
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sector human and organizational infrastructure essential for the country's overall long-term 
development… 
Evidence of unintended damaging effects of aid does not necessarily imply that the net effects 
of aid on development are negative. Donors' use of human resources, however sub-optimal, 
may sometimes be more efficient than the government's use of them. Rather, the implication of 
this paper is that donor practices produce less damaging side effects when donors have a higher 
share of the aid market in a recipient country or when they are more altruistic (i.e., motivated 
more by development concerns). (Knack and Rahman 24: 2007) 
 
 
Too many projects which cannot be easily overseen can be detrimental to the growth 
of good government.  While large multinational corporations acting as dominant 
donors can help lower cost of government monitoring, there has been a shift away 
from top down development aid in CSR which might increase project maintenance 
costs.  The strain of monitoring projects in turn raises costs of governance and the 
opportunity for funds and resources to be misappropriated or misused.   
While single organizations can be given funds and put charge of large portions of the 
aid market, building a bureaucracy is often thought of as something to be avoided 
within aid organizations.  This is because they want to be as efficient as possible, but a 
lack of bureaucracy might be detrimental to long-term aid effectiveness and 
monitoring.  Thus, the need for local CSR projects to be integrated into a larger 
framework is clear and necessary not only for the efficiency of spending, but also to 
decrease strain on government institutions.  Economic growth and development often 
require integrated systems of support and supplying one piece of the puzzle alone 
might not make a sufficient impact on development.  Crucial to any such long-term 
development will be the strength of institutions and the government’s ability to take 
over the care of its people.  The government must be prepared for this challenge and 
involved in the oversight of local projects while still having their institutions protected 
from the potential strain of monitoring a vast number of local projects.  
 
4.3 Micro-level CSR educational projects 
The development of human capital is extremely important for economic growth within 
resource rich countries (Nelson and Phelps 1966; Lucas 1988; Romer 1990; Mankiw et 
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al. 1992).  Other empirical studies have also shown that the stock of human capital and 
the level of investment in education is positively correlated to growth (McMahon 
1998; Keller 2006).   
Many corporations have education projects at the forefront of their activities, but the 
effect of education on economic growth is more complicated than the mere assertion 
that it is beneficial.  In evaluating these educational projects, one must take into 
account what type of aid is being given, to which level of education, and the amount of 
development in the recipient country.  Even controlling for these factors, there is 
disagreement as to where aid is best spent, and the studies that have been done have 
been done on a macro scale, so it is difficult to drawn any conclusions about the 
effectiveness of investment in local educational projects.
2
 
The quantitative studies that have been done are on foreign aid, and have not been 
focused on CSR initiatives. Among those done on foreign aid there have been 
contradictory results.  Asiedu and Nandwa (2007) find that in low income countries, 
investment in primary education has a positive effect on economic growth, while 
investment in secondary education has no effect on economic growth.  A study by 
Katarina Keller might help to understand why this is so, as she found that aid to 
secondary education was not utilized unless enrollment was also increased.     
It should also be noted that Asiedu and Nandwa found that investment in education in 
middle income countries had a negative affect.  Middle income countries often had 
sufficient primary and secondary education systems in place and aid was given usually 
in the form of loans, which had to be repaid.  This increased debt without substantially 
aiding the countries.  
                                                 
2
 Many of the studies on education focus on the United States and other developed countries where the education 
systems and demands from the labor market very greatly from the developing world.  While education in the first 
world might lead to one outcome, it is less clear that the economy in less developed nations is capable of 
providing opportunities for the more educated.  Also studies from the developed world are not often translatable 
to countries where there is not a preexisting “basic” educational system, as it ubiquitous in the developed world.  
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It is important in implementing CSR that the particular needs of the country are 
assessed because educational projects are not a universal solution to all ills of a society 
everywhere, but can be effective in certain instances.  Keller found that: 
Education indirectly affects other development goals. Primary and secondary enrollment rates 
and expenditures per primary school pupil significantly lower fertility rates. Primary 
enrollment rates attract investment in physical capital, and secondary enrollment rates promote 
openness and decrease inflation. College enrollment rates and expenditures thereon are 
important to political rights. (Keller 32: 2008) 
 
Keller also found that: 
Policy favorable to growth should raise student enrollment rates and allocate public 
expenditure increases mainly toward the lower education stages, while ensuring that 
expenditures per student are kept up with any increases in student cohorts. The quality of 
education needs to be kept high at the lower stages while increasing enrollment rates from the 
bottom-up, in order to benefit most students and to make the next education stage beneficial to 
growth. DCs (Developed Countries) have expanded and improved education from the lower 
stages up. (Keller 33: 2008) 
 
These findings should help inform us on the use of micro-level financing of schools 
through CSR.  The fact that primary education might help in reducing fertility rates of 
the population, is important.  Increased primary education not only creates the 
potential for further education and qualifications, but also has the effect of stemming 
birth rates; and while it does not have a direct effect on growth through job 
preparedness, it does aid the population in making better choices and this creates the 
opportunity for better economic growth.  On the other hand, the creation of secondary 
schools is not an asset unless there exists a significant enough population that has 
received satisfactory primary school education to utilize it and enrolment is increased.   
It is not until the tertiary level of education that more political rights are fostered.   
While primary and secondary education are necessary to prepare students for tertiary 
education, it is only at the tertiary level that education results in fostering the desire for 
greater political rights.  Micro-level education programs usually stop well short of 
tertiary education.  Tertiary education is necessary to encourage good governance 
which in turn is the key to counteracting the negative effects from resource 
dependence.  Thus, for less developed countries, it is a very long term project of 
building human capital from the ground up.  This process will often be too long to 
assure that the relatively short term revenues inflows that come from the petroleum 
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industry are spent for the benefit of the population.  If an education system is set up 
though a company grant, it would be years before students could reach the tertiary 
level of education and begin effecting good governance.  By this time, much of the 
resource revenue would have already been misappropriated or used in less efficient 
ways.   
As it is best to have strong institutions before the start of resource extraction, 
education seems to be an implausible solution to the issues of good governance for the 
near future.  While education is critical for continued economic growth, it cannot be 
counted on, in the short term, as the driver for governmental reform and therefore will 
not have the macro-level effects that are necessary for monitoring and implementing 
robust policies for regulating the economy.  
Communities might benefit from local educational projects but, in order to see real 
society wide benefits, education must be implemented on the macro-level and must be 
done in a systematic way.  These factors, coupled with the previously mentioned 
disadvantages that it enables the government not to fulfill its educational obligations 
through the development of more robust institutions, lead to a question of the ability of 
micro-level education projects to have a profound effect on society at large.   
It has been hypnotized by Gylfason (2001), Birdsall et al. (2001) and Behbudi et. al 
(2010) that the existence of revenue flows from natural resources can even lead to 
diminished spending by governments on education, because there is a tendency for 
policy to favor the elites and complacency in implementing policy:  
For example, the OPEC countries send 57 percent of their youngsters to secondary school 
compared with 64 percent for the world as a whole and they spend less than 4 percent of their 
GNP on education on average compared with almost 5 percent for the world as a whole (the 
figures refer to 1997). Blessed by an unusually rich and reliable rent stream, Botswana is an 
exception: its expenditure on education relative to income continues to be among the largest in 
the world. (Gylfason 3: 2001) 
 
Micro-level education spending is highly unlikely to take the place of government 
spending in education.  Skjærseth et. al, (2004) argue that it might be possible for 
micro-level educational projects to bridge the gap and affect the country on a macro-
level.  This is unlikely to happen though because there is a tendency to cut educational 
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spending.  Thus in effect micro-level education spending will likely be an insufficient 
solution to educational demands.  Therefore macro-level governmental policy can be 
hurting future economic growth.   
From the literature, we know that there is an inverse relationship between oil dependence and 
the level of spending in education, all other things being equal, mainly due to overconfidence 
in the future and less of a need to invest in human capital (Gylfason, 2001). Rajkumar and 
Swaroop (2008) demonstrate that efficiency of public spending in education is affected by the 
quality of governance (measured mainly by quality of bureaucracy and the level of corruption). 
(Devarajan et. al 17: 2010) 
 
Levels of corruption and the quality of institutions must be controlled in order to 
improve investment in education.  Funding of education must be approached on a 
macro-level, since micro-level educational projects are not a plausible solution. 
 
4.4 Micro-level CSR healthcare Initiatives 
Healthcare initiatives not only make the local communities more healthy but, there is a 
great body of evidence showing that access to health care also improves economic 
development. (Behrman and Rosenzweig 2001; Thomas 2001; Shariff 2003; Bell, 
Devarajan, and Gersbach 2004; Bloom, Canning, and Jamison 2004; Thomas, et al. 
2004; Smith 2005; Thirumurthy, Graff Zivin, and Goldstein 2005; Jamison 2006).  
These findings go beyond the previous true assumptions, that economic development 
would help access to healthcare.  Nutrition and increases in access to healthcare for 
children has also boosted educational attainment amongst children (Bloom, Canning, 
Jamison 2004; Jamison 2006).  In addition, Haacker (2004) found that the provision of 
good health care was imperative to promoting investment since HIV/AIDS, as well as 
malaria, hurt the economy by limiting investment because of companies’ fears about 
absenteeism and high turn-over rates.   
Providing better health care through CSR can be vital to improving economic 
performance as well as bettering the lives of the population by decreasing infant 
mortality, improving family planning and cutting rates of maternal death.  All of this 
bodes well for local CSR projects geared towards community health and the potential 
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impact these could have on the economy and lives of people.    One caveat must be 
noted:  These studies have not been restricted to resource rich countries.  Their 
findings may not be totally applicable to resource rich countries.  Increased access to 
healthcare in the presence of an economy distorted because of revenue inflows might 
not create similar growth as in less resource rich countries.  An economy is extremely 
complex and merely creating a better environment for investment through provision of 
increased healthcare might not counteract the difficulties of dealing with increased 
inflation, poor local governance and generally less competitive sectors outside of the 
resource sector.  Healthcare is an important factor in development economic growth 
and also a rising standard of living, but it is only one pillar and must be managed in a 
larger system.  
 
4.5 Institutional constraints to micro-level CSR 
The most difficult problem with local projects is that often they do not come to 
fruition.  Local projects can be beneficial to local communities, but the end results are 
often far different than proposals and the rhetoric does not match the reality.  
[A] report commissioned by Shell but prepared by independent consultants, makes depressing 
reading. Shell has not made it public. Having looked at 82 of the 408 projects on Shell’s 
books—ranging from the electrification of villages to building schools and hospitals—the team 
concludes that less than a third have been successful. Farm projects and those that aim to make 
villages more self-sufficient by giving them the means to earn more do least well. The micro-
credit schemes run by women do best.  
The report finds that the company has still been decreeing too many projects from on high. 
Although it has tried, it is still essentially buying off the locals with gifts—some of them forced 
out of it by ransom-demanding kidnappers and protection-merchants—rather than helping 
people to develop their future, (Economist 2001). 
 
“Successful” here means completed.  Less than a third of the schools, hospitals or 
other local projects that were slated to be built actually were completed.  The potential 
benefit of local CSR projects is not as great as the rhetoric would indicate.   
There are many of reasons why CSR programs have failed. 
Why, then, do companies such as Shell in Nigeria fail in their developmental efforts? As 
argued above, one key reason is the primacy of the ‘business case’ and the incompatibility of 
corporate objectives with developmental objectives. During the research for this article a 
number of other important constraints on the implementation of CSR were identified: 
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• country- and context-specific issues; 
• failure to involve the beneficiaries of CSR; 
• lack of human resources; 
• social attitudes of oil company staff and a focus on technical and managerial 
   solutions; 
• failure to integrate CSR initiatives into a larger development plan. 
 
Again, this list is not exhaustive, but it can serve to point out the limited 
developmental potential of any CSR initiatives, (Frynas 588: 2005). 
These limitations present great problems to the implementation of CSR, but should 
also inform the study of CSR workers and planners.  Projects can often be created for 
public relation reasons, or to make workers feel better about their positive impact on 
community, and can ignore more beneficial projects that might not generate the same 
amount of good feeling or positive press.   
There have been attempts to reform the system of CSR though it is unclear if these 
have been particularly effective.   
This evolution can be witnessed in the case of SPDC in Nigeria. SPDC has recently 
reorganized its community development unit into the Sustainable Community Development 
(SCD) unit, with a new emphasis on sustainability and the long-term perspective for all its 
projects. The company has moved away from its focus on infrastructure projects such as 
hospitals towards more promising smaller projects such as micro-credit schemes. SPDC has 
entered into partnership with external development agencies such as USAID and various 
NGOs, which have greater expertise in implementing development projects on the ground and 
which now do so on behalf of SPDC. SPDC has also introduced various guidelines for 
implementing development- related projects to ensure some consistency. Some of SPDC’s 
schemes—notably microcredit schemes for women implemented by NGOs—are considered 
relatively successful from a micro-level developmental perspective. Therefore, Shell in Nigeria 
is an instructive case for investigating the multiple potentials of CSR for development. 
However, Shell in Nigeria is also a good example of the constraints faced by even the most 
sophisticated use of current CSR practices within firms. While SPDC—or, more specifically, 
its SCD unit—has been ahead of other oil companies in terms of its development thinking, 
there are still major flaws in Shell’s development work, and the results of that work are likely 
to remain disappointing. Even a number of senior Shell staff and consultants have admitted in 
private conversations that the creation of the SCD unit is unlikely to have a major impact on 
the company’s behaviour in local communities. (Frynas 588: 2005) 
 
This is not to say that there have not been positive developments in local CSR 
initiatives. There have been some benchmark applications of CSR, but much of that 
has taken place outside of the direct control of oil companies.  
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4.6 Micro-level CSR initiatives may have unintended 
detrimental effects on the population 
Although the academic literature has yet discuss the point, it is important to understand 
that micro-level CSR projects, while well-intentioned and temporarily useful, can have 
the unintended effect of supporting authoritarian or corrupt regimes by pacifying the 
population and discouraging them from asking for a greater voice in and greater 
benefits from their government.  Ultimately, this creates the potential for harming the 
long-term interests of the population.  
Kevin Morrison, in his work on non-tax revenue (2009), found that resource revenue 
could be used for greater social expenditures in dictatorships in order to pacify the 
populations and give them less reason to push for expanded rights.  However, none of 
the studies have gone on to point out that corporate micro-level CSR projects might 
have a similar effect in pacifying the populace and creating less pressure for social 
change.  Creating hospitals, schools and basic infrastructure to relieve some of the 
more critical problems might actually make pressure for greater social change more 
unlikely.  Here the government and the corporation might gain through regime 
stability, but the population would be hurt in the long term. 
Karl Marx argued against the creation of the welfare state, because it would only delay 
the population’s eventual revolution.  While the services provided by local CSR 
initiatives can be said to be supplying “goods” in terms of greater access to healthcare, 
education, or basic infrastructure, it is possible that they may have the effect of 
pacifying the population and discouraging them from seeking or obtaining even 
greater “goods” from their governments.  The population’s long-term goals might be 
undermined by short-term pacification.  If the population organized and were better 
represented in government there might be a better chance of long term development.   
It is crucial both for the moral rationalization for and effectiveness of CSR that it not 
be permitted to be used to further strengthen oppressive or unrepresentative 
governments.  This is a great concern when CSR is not engaged directly with 
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governmental reform.  While Frynas argues that calls for CSR alleviate pressure on the 
government to take on a developmental role, he might not go far enough by omitting to 
say that CSR also relieves pressure on the government itself to institute greater 
governmental reforms.  
Corporations should be mindful of the potential for these adverse effects and try to be 
sure that CSR projects are used to mitigate the detrimental effects of corporate 
activities on the population and not to prop up corrupt or ineffective governments.  
 
4.7 Micro-level CSR projects: antagonism between  
communities 
Frynas argues local CSR projects in some communities can cause other communities 
that do not receive such projects to feel animosity towards the favored communities, 
because there is competition for resources and jealousy concerning resources that are 
given to some but not to others.  
Preference for one community may breed jealousy from other communities and give rise to 
intercommunal conflicts. In one extreme case narrated to the author, members of one 
community burned down a relatively successful ‘host community’ (which was located closer to 
oil company premises than their own) in order to benefit from host community status 
themselves. This is perhaps the most extreme example of the grave effects that can result from 
adopting a micro-level rather than a macro-level perspective in implementing CSR. 
Most basically, perhaps, as oil companies are not development agencies, they do not tend to 
prioritize overall development goals, so there are inherent limitations on the contribution social 
initiatives can make to the greater whole. (Frynas 593: 2005) 
 
When a micro-level CSR approach is taken, corporations can be seen to be favoring 
certain groups or communities over others.   Such projects are likely to be undertaken 
only in those areas where the oil company has operations, rather than equitably across 
the country.  Also, oil companies most likely will have limited experience with local 
populations and local issues, meaning that they can easily inflame tensions or 
exacerbate problems by their actions.  A more effective solution would be to have the 
oil company assist the government and local organizations in designing and 
implementing such programs in order to alleviate these problems.  
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4.8 Best practices in micro-level CSR 
One project started by Statoil that has proven to be very effective is its Akassa project 
in Bayelsa State in Nigeria.  The project was designed by a local NGO named 
ProNatura, which had extensive experience within the development field and was 
allowed to run the project without input from the oil company.  It was based entirely 
on local priorities, and conceptualized by individuals on the local level.  ProNatura had 
studied the local population extensively and over a long period of time where staff 
members lived in the local community and understood local needs.  The program was 
also community led, involving not only the local chiefs, but also the larger community 
including representatives of women and youth.  ProNatura was designed to help local 
people to help themselves by setting up new institutions including a development 
foundation and community development councils along with training and advice for 
local people.  This project was also integrated into the larger Akassa clan, which 
contains over 30,000 people. (Frynas 2005) 
The program boasts the following accomplishments: 
• Human resources development - 18 health posts have been established and 32 health post 
attendants have been recruited; 
• Natural resources management - An inventory has been made of the forest resources of 
Akassa and the Akassa Forest and Wildlife Regulation has been amended; 
• Poverty alleviation/micro-credit - Successful registration of 60 micro-savings and credit 
groups with a 100% recovery rate in 2003-4; the micro-credit agency will serve the Bayelsa 
State and the UNDP as a micro-credit training and extension agency; 
• Infrastructure/micro-projects - Rehabilitation of health centres, construction of wooden 
bridges, rehabilitation of primary school buildings all were achieved; 
• Institutional development/capacity building - A number of development institutions have 
been established and its members have received training aimed at improving their capacity for 
good governance. (World Business Council 3: 2005) 
 
This project is widely seen as the benchmark for effective local CSR and is being 
emulated by other companies including Total and a Canadian firm Nexen, (Frynas, 
2005).   
Even if this process can be replicated, it will not solve all of the problems. “CSR does 
not solve some of the most fundamental problems arising from oil operations, namely 
the negative impact of the oil industry on the environment, society and governance,” 
(Frynas 2005).  The damage to the environment and to society can exist throughout the 
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entire chain of oil production from drilling the wells to transportation and refining, 
thus creating problems much larger than localized areas.   
 
4.9 Case Specific issues of countries with resource 
wealth 
One of the failings of CSR has been a failure to understand case specific variables, 
which has often lead to a one size fits all approach which does not work in the real 
world.  Different countries face very different problems and have very different needs 
based on the level of development, type of government, and history.  CSR responses 
must bear this in mind.  The petroleum industry must also recognize that the stresses 
and demands from countries in which they operate can be very different from the CSR 
needs of countries with other types of industries.  The petroleum industry has yet to 
take responsibility for the distortive effect that the sudden revenue increases can cause.   
[W]hy the companies do not fully accept the `paradox of plenty problem’ and what can they do 
if they accept a causal relationship between oil revenues and poor social performance.  The 
answer to the first part of this question may actually lie in the second part: there are 
considerable dilemmas confronting the oil industry when it comes to defining the limits to 
corporate social responsibility, e.g. interference in domestic affairs of host countries, and 
investments/disinvestments in areas with poverty and unrest. For the companies claiming to 
have a broader social responsibility, e.g. ‘a force for good’ (BP) and ‘building a better world’ 
(Shell), the paradox of plenty directly affects their legitimacy as corporate citizens. (Skjærseth 
et. al 14: 2004) 
 
While doubt has been cast on some aspects of the “paradox of plenty” or the “resource 
curse”, there is good evidence for having “resource concern”, or the realization that 
resources might not be an automatic good.  It should be easier for companies to 
understand this and deal with it now that the resource curse is no longer thought of as a 
law of nature, but it will require significant insight into their role within countries.  
The petroleum industry as well as other resource extracting companies must accept 
that they have a different role to play than other types of corporations.   
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5 Macro-level CSR and dealing with 
problems associated with resource 
exploitation 
Many of the problems facing petroleum producing countries tend to be macro in 
nature.  The primary macro problems arising from resource exploitation are the result 
of the inability of the existing national institutions to properly manage the tremendous 
inflows of revenues produced by the development and sale of the resource.   The 
availability of these revenues tend to lead to increased corruption, stress on 
governmental institutions and distortion of the economy.  These problems are systemic 
in nature and must be broadly addressed.  Some oil companies, notably BP and Shell 
(Skjærseth et. al, 2004), are moving away from micro-level CSR and are attempting to 
address these systemic problems with macro-level CSR initiatives.  Macro-level CSR 
programs are based upon the premise that petroleum and other extractive industries 
should not only engage in projects to ameliorate the direct effects of their operations 
upon local communities, but should also assume some responsibility for the larger, 
indirect consequences of the large inflows of revenues they create upon the 
government and economy. 
These macro-level initiatives consist primarily of promoting transparency with respect 
to the amounts of oil revenues the government receives and advice to the government 
about improvements in governance and the management of these revenues to benefit 
the population.  The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the concepts and initiatives 
that have been used by macro-level CSR programs in an attempt to improve 
governance and the use of revenues produced by petroleum and other minerals.  
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5.1 Micro-level CSR initiatives to promote good 
governance 
Although the governance and economic problems associated with resource revenues 
are intertwined, it is useful as an analytical tool to approach them separately.  Here, I 
will first set forth the macro-level CSR efforts to improve the quality of governance 
through transparency, and in the next section deal with CSR efforts to assist the 
government in managing resource revenues to avoid or mitigate their effects upon the 
economy. 
 
5.2 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI)  
The movement to bring more transparency to the payment of oil revenues to the 
governments resulted in the creation of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) in 2003.  EITI is a broad based macro-level CSR initiative that was 
created by the British government in partnership with petroleum companies from the 
OECD.  EITI’s first principle states that, “We share a belief that the prudent use of 
natural resource wealth should be an important engine for sustainable economic 
growth that contributes to sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if not 
managed properly, can create negative economic and social impacts,” (EITI a). EITI’s 
primary goal is to increase transparency in governance. To further this principle, EITI 
records and publishes the amount of revenues that governments receive from 
extractive industries. 
Each EITI implementing country commits itself to six EITI ‘criteria’, which include 
independent audits of all extractive sector payments received by the government and a work 
plan for the government, ‘including measurable targets, a timetable for implementation and an 
assessment of potential capacity constraints’. As of July 2008, the EITI was formally 
supported by 16 oil and gas companies (Extractive Industry’s Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
2008).  
 
A key strength of the initiative was that it would involve all companies in a member country, 
which avoids collective action problems that BP faced in Angola. Another strength was the 
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requirement to involve civil society and independent auditors, which helps to properly oversee 
the implementation of the EITI in a given country.  
 
The establishment of a ‘revenue savings fund’ is one example of how revenue transparency 
can help towards reducing ‘resource curse’ effects. For instance, the creation of the State Oil 
Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOFAZ) has to some extent protected the local economy in 
Azerbaijan from extreme currency appreciation and oil price fluctuations, by depositing a part 
of the country’s oil revenues in an overseas account. SOFAZ became (in the words of the 
Economist Intelligence Unit) ‘the most transparent government body in Azerbaijan’ 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006, p. 26). The establishment of SOFAZ was conducive to 
EITI membership and the EITI helps to ensure the publication of annual data on Azerbaijani 
revenue flows. (Fryas 168: 2010) 
 
EITI recognizes that resource revenues can have detrimental effects and lead to 
negative results, if not properly managed.  This initiative has forced petroleum 
companies to come into line with policies that attempt to mitigate the negative effects 
of resource revenue, even if many of them have not admitted to themselves that 
resources can be a mixed blessing (EITI). 
As of now thirteen countries have fully implemented the policies of the EITI, while 
one other country (Yemen
3
) has been suspended.  Another 20 countries are now 
candidate countries, while one other country (Madagascar
4
) has also been suspended 
from candidacy. 
In order to be a compliant member, all a country need do is publish the amount of 
revenue it receives from extractive industries.  The EITI has no role beyond 
publicizing the amount of wealth that is generated and received by the country.  Even 
if all of the revenue went to graft a country would still be fully compliant with the 
EITI if the total amount of the revenue it received was disclosed.  The way the EITI is 
now implemented it can only have a limited impact due to the narrow scope of its 
initiatives.   
                                                 
3
 “[T]he Board (of the EITI) agreed to temporarily suspend Yemen from the EITI process on 9 June 2011 citing 
concerns that it was "not satisfied that the full and active participation of civil society and other actors in EITI 
implementation could be maintained"'. (EITI b) 
4
 "On 25 October 2011, the Board (of the EITI) suspended Madagascar noting that it did "not believe that the 
relationships necessary for effective EITI implementation in Madagascar are currently possible and capable of 
being sustained". The suspension will hold "until the current international situation is resolved. We trust, 
however, that on a national level the multi-stakeholder group will continue as best possible"’. (EITI c) 
http://eiti.org/Madagascar 
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 [M]ost studies on transparency suggest that a number of conditions must be fulfilled in order 
to maximise the positive impact of transparency. Based on the literature, at least three 
conditions are necessary: (1) free media; (2) involvement of civil society and (3) timing of 
introducing transparency. In other words, the success of the EITI depends on these three 
conditions, (Fryas 169: 2010). 
 
While the EITI is a good starting point, it needs to be expanded as it is only one side of 
the equation of corruption, and there is no way of distinguishing the difference 
between governments that are effectively using funds and those that are not based 
solely on EITI data.   
In its 2008 report, the World Bank (which now oversees a trust fund designed to aid in 
compiling country reports) argues that countries that have implemented EITI policies 
have signaled to the world community a commitment to good governance and 
eliminating corruption.  
By producing regular EITI reports on payments and revenues, a country may be able to 
improve the creditworthiness of the government and of companies. Sovereign credit ratings are 
based on a country’s quality of governance and its medium-term ability to meet financial 
obligations. As information in the public domain about revenues becomes more reliable, the 
ability of financial institutions and rating agencies to assess a country’s creditworthiness is 
enhanced. Improved creditworthiness will in turn enhance a country’s likelihood of attracting 
loan and equity finance, and will lower the cost of such finance, (World Bank 8: 2008). 
 
Other possible benefits of such transparency are cited by the World Bank, like the 
creation of trust between governments, NGOs and civil society.  The World Bank also 
views EITI as a stepping stone to greater governmental transparency.  As of yet there 
is little evidence to support the claims of the World Bank or others who assert it will 
lead to positive outcomes. 
Previous research measured the transparency of individual countries according to quantitative 
indicators such as macroeconomic forecasts (Gelos and Wei, 2005), the publication of IMF 
reports on the macroeconomic performance of countries (Glennerster and Shin, 2003) and the 
quality of government budget documentation (Alt and Lassen, 2006a). All of these studies 
imply that the quality of decision-making on spending is crucial, in terms of complying with 
international norms and accounting standards, publication and independent verification of 
government budgets, and the actual outcomes of decision-making.  
Not a single study quoted earlier focused specifically on the transparency of revenues; indeed, 
there appears to be an assumption among researchers that transparency of revenues is a 
secondary concern. (Frynas 173: 2010) 
 
 
While some are hopeful that the EITI initiative will be helpful in limiting corruption, it 
is still too early in the process to tell if it will be successful.  Frynas further states that, 
“In summary, there is no scientific basis for the assertion that revenue transparency 
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leads to better social or economic outcomes,” (Frynas, 177: 2010).  There are large 
limiting factors, like the fact that reporting by the countries can vary widely in their 
quality and validity.  Also the publication of reports does little good if there is not an 
active civil society to access and evaluate the reports.  Without a robust civil society, 
there is no one to utilize the reports to pressure governments or bring about better 
governance.   
Transparency, or access to information, can have an effect on corruption. Transparency can 
reduce bureaucratic corruption by making corrupt acts more risky, by making it easier to 
provide good incentives to public officials, and by easing the selection of honest and efficient 
people for public service. Transparency can reduce political corruption by helping make 
politicians more accountable to the public. More generally, transparency can facilitate 
cooperation over opportunistic rent-seeking and help maintain norms of integrity and trust. 
 
However, transparency has an effect on corruption only under certain circumstances. Agents 
whose access to information is increased, must also have an ability to process the information, 
and the ability and incentives to act on that information. The impact of transparency therefore 
depends on the level of education of an electorate, the extent to which key stakeholders have 
the power to hold a government to account, and the private or collective nature of the goods 
about which information is provided. Transparency reform may also backfire if the type of 
information provided eases identification of the relevant officials to bribe. Moreover, since 
government officials may obtain large rents due to informational advantages, transparency 
reform may be hard to implement. (Kolstad and Wiig 22: 2007) 
 
The EITI takes for granted that a civil society exists to be able to use the numbers and 
figures provided, but this is often not the case in many of the countries that report to 
EITI.  It also poses conceptual difficulties since it myopically deals only with 
transparency with respect to incoming revenues rather than with respect to 
expenditures.  
More fundamentally, though transparency can have an effect on corruption, this does not 
necessarily imply that increasing access to information should receive the highest priority in 
addressing corruption in resource-rich countries. Arguably, priority should be given to the 
types of reform that have the greatest effect in reducing corruption and alleviating the resource 
curse. The resource curse literature provides evidence that proper institutions that constrain 
rent-seeking and patronage, are the key to avoiding a detrimental effect of resource rents. In 
this perspective, it is not immediately apparent that transparency reform should receive 
priority. At the very least, the effectiveness of improving transparency should be more 
systematically evaluated vis-à-vis other policy options. 
 
If transparency in some form is sufficiently important as to merit priority, increased access to 
information should focus on the areas most important to curbing corruption and alleviating the 
resource curse. Current approaches, such as the EITI, have tended to focus on transparency in 
public revenues. Given the centrality of public expenditures in patronage politics in resource-
rich countries, the focus on revenues is not necessarily the most effective one in addressing 
corruption. In view of the resource curse literature, the emphasis of the EITI on revenues rather 
than on expenditures, thus appears misplaced. (Is Transparency the Key to Reducing 
Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries?) (Kolstad and Wiig 22: 2007) 
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Another problem with EITI is its focus on governments rather than on companies. 
Frynas states that this creates the following problem: 
The EITI focuses on the cooperation between the UK government and host governments in 
developing countries; the initiative does not assign an active role to oil, gas and mining 
companies in improving governance. The failure to assign a clearer role to companies 
constrains the pressure on host governments, because the UK government or the World Bank 
sometimes have less influence over host governments than the multinational companies. 
(Frynas 174: 2010) 
 
While it is a positive development that transparency may result in governments facing 
pressure from both their populations and NGOs to use oil revenues better, it is also 
crucial that the petroleum companies not be seen as being without responsibility.  
Companies still have an immense amount of power and resources at their disposal to 
make sure that the exploitation of resources in a country does not lead to a degradation 
of the quality of life of the people living there.  
Despite the problems with the EITI, some hope that it ultimately will lead to broader 
and more comprehensive reforms from the international community.   To date, there is 
little evidence to substantiate this hope, but the EITI might lead to initiatives that are 
demonstrably effective like the publication of revenue spending which has been shown 
to limit corruption (Frynas).  Terry Lynn Karl (2009) argues in favor of the EITI by 
saying that transparency is the first step needed in order to create effective governance, 
because it allows other actors to see what is happening.  It should therefore be seen as 
a useful step towards building better governance.  It has also helped to ameliorate one 
of the major problems which was the lack of collective action.  
All major OECD petroleum companies are members of the EITI that support its 
initiatives and this makes it more difficult for a country to avoid reporting revenues by 
picking a non-member company to develop its resources.  Lack of collective action is 
one of the biggest problems facing CSR, because without collective action, there can 
be a race to the bottom where the company that does not require transparency has a 
competitive advantage over those that do.  In order for EITI member companies not to 
be placed at a competitive disadvantage, universal adoption of initiatives like the EITI 
is required to even the playing field as well as to increase pressure on governments to 
increase reporting of revenues and implement changes.   
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5.3 Development of the EITI ++ (Plus Plus) 
The EITI ++ is a plan that is still in development, so full details are not yet available, 
but it plans to be a comprehensive approach to aiding governments manage their 
resource wealth.   
Broadening the focus of EITI’s revenue transparency agenda, EITI++ will cover the entire 
breadth of the resource chain, from extraction, to other stages such as processing, managing 
revenues, and promoting sustainable and efficient utilization of resource wealth. The EITI ++ 
will seek to support committed governments, notably in Africa, in implementing good policy 
and practice throughout the whole process of natural resource utilization. (World Bank 
website)  
 
The EITI ++ also states the importance of all aspects of petroleum extraction and 
related government activity.  
The entire chain of managing extractive industry resources is important—from how access to 
those resources is granted, to monitoring operations, to collecting taxes, to sound 
macroeconomic management and distribution of revenues, and to spending resources 
effectively for sustainable growth and poverty reduction, (World Bank website).  
While these initiatives are important and focus on macro-level issues associated with 
resource wealth, they do fail to engage one of the primary actors in petroleum 
extraction - the companies themselves.  The reality in countries with fragile 
institutions and weak governance is that there has to be pressure from multiple sources 
and a uniform commitment to dealing with the problems.  This means that companies 
must have a robust commitment and plan for assisting in the solution of these macro-
level issues.  It is not enough for other governments to apply pressure on countries 
with poor governance and weak institutions.  
By involving the petroleum corporations who are the direct source of the revenues, in 
these measures, more pressure can be applied on governments.  The important role that 
corporations play in the countries economies and policies cannot be ignored, and it 
must be integrated into programs to try and strengthen institutions.   
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5.4 Macro-level CSR initiatives: Planning the 
economy  
In addition to macro-level CSR initiatives designed to promote good governance, 
companies may also have a role in providing advice and expertise to assist 
governments to properly manage their resource revenues to avoid or mitigate some of 
the most common adverse effects upon the economy.  Since macro-level CSR 
initiatives are in an early stage of development, there are not many examples of 
corporate CSR being used to advise or assist countries in managing their economies.  
However, one important groundbreaking example of this is BP’s involvement in the 
operation of SOFAZ, the state run oil fund in Azerbaijan, which is discussed in detail 
in Chapter 5.   
Economic problems can occur because the government does not have enough expertise 
or established institutions to deal with them, but can also happen because governments 
are lulled into a false since of security.  They fail to plan for a future after their 
resources are depleted.  Oil companies can help countries realize the importance of 
investing for the future, especially the importance of human capital.  Human capital is 
key to diversifying the economy and insuring future growth.     
Many of the economic stresses that resource rich countries face are well known and it 
is understood how they should be dealt with.  Problems with respect to Dutch disease 
can easily be prevented or remedied by proper management. 
The real fear of the Dutch Disease, in short, is that the non-oil export sector will be squeezed, 
thereby squeezing a major source of technological progress in the economy. But this fear is 
vastly overblown if the oil proceeds are being properly invested as part of a national 
development strategy. If the proceeds from oil are used not for consumption but for public 
investment, the negative consequences of real exchange rate appreciation can be outweighed. 
(Sachs 184: 2007) 
 
Problems like Dutch disease are not endemic to petroleum producing countries as the 
“resource curse” theory would have us believe, but can be controlled given good 
planning and institutions.  The problem lies in creating those institutions where they do 
not already exist.  
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Another issue experienced by resource rich countries is the volatility of prices for their 
resources which can lead to “boom or bust” type expansions and contractions in 
resource revenues, but this too can be dealt with in several ways, primarily by 
maintaining even amounts of spending over the long term.  The most popular way to 
deal with the issue is to establish a sovereign wealth fund which can store wealth when 
commodity prices are high and augment government revenue in lean years.  This was 
successfully done in Chile with Copper Stabilization Fund (CSF).  “The fund has 
generally accomplished its purpose, and budget expenditures have not closely 
followed revenue variability, as was the case prior to the CSF,” (Morrision 4: 2010). 
And, as previously mentioned, the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund has achieved 
good results. 
Countries with good governance and functioning institutions, or those that are on the 
path to establishing them, have been the most successful in handling the problems 
associated with resource development. Botswana is an example of this: 
By the time the diamonds came on stream, the country had already started to build a relatively 
democratic polity and efficient institutions. The surge of wealth likely reinforced this. Because 
of the breadth of the BDP [Botswana Democratic Party] coalition, diamond rents were widely 
distributed, and the extent of this wealth increased the opportunity cost of undermining the 
good institutional path, (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson  105-6: 2003)  
 
The success stories with regard to development and natural resources tend to be 
confined to areas that were probably going to be successes anyway, because of their 
commitment to good governance and well-functioning institutions.  Countries that 
managed revenue wealth successfully had been doing it previously. (Davis et. al 2001; 
Pegg 2006; Independent Evaluation Group 2009).  There have not been many 
examples of countries which have turned around government institutions and 
economic growth where they were once dysfunctional.   
 
5.5 Chad and the World Bank: Managing the money 
One of the most complete and comprehensive macro-level programs that has ever been 
tried was in Chad.  The project, including international monitoring, advice on spending 
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and investment, was overseen by the World Bank.  All of the programs and institutions 
were set up before money from petroleum started to arrive.  
Despite the Bank’s “unprecedented system of safeguards assuring that the revenues are used to 
reduce poverty,” there were major problems of noncompliance with the Bank’s various desires 
(Pegg 2006; Gould and Winters Forthcoming). Chad’s President Idriss De´by spent $4.5 
million of his country’s $25 million “signing bonus” on his military. The IMF (2003) found 
that the government was not allocating sufficient funds to health, education, and other priority 
sectors. And the group that monitors Chad’s compliance with environmental and social 
safeguards found that the government was not following the country’s own stated poverty 
reduction strategy (International Advisory Group 2004). In 2005, De´by amended his country’s 
revenue law to spend more on the military, in direct violation of Bank conditions. While the 
Bank protested initially, it eventually capitulated.  In March 2008, De´by used a state of 
emergency decree to suspend Chad’s compliance with the remaining Bank conditions with 
regard to poverty spending. Finally, in September 2008, the Bank decided to cancel the project. 
 
In other words, the most elaborate measures designed to date to change the way a government 
uses its natural resources were unsuccessful. A recent evaluation of the project by the 
Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank concluded that the project’s fundamental 
objective of reducing poverty and improving governance was not achieved. Just as 
significantly, the review concluded that “no alternative program design or closer supervision 
would have allowed to achieve [sic] the program’s development objectives in the absence of 
government commitment” (Independent Evaluation Group 2009, p. viii). (Morrison 11: 2010) 
 
The experience with Chad has proven that one of the fundamental problems in 
developing resources within countries that lack proper institutions is the lack of will of 
governments to reform.  The World Bank was in agreement with the independent 
evaluation of the project which found: 
[W]e agree with IEG (Independent Evaluation Group) findings that the lack of government 
commitment was the key obstacle to the success of the program. A project of this sort cannot 
succeed without Government commitment and responsibility. No alternative design or 
supervision could have delivered substantially more favorable development impacts in the 
absence of real and sustained government ownership. Capacity could not be enhanced if the 
Government was not truly motivated to build institutions such as the College. Faced with 
increasing security concerns and increased oil prices which made aid flows much less 
important, the Government of Chad reneged on the agreements that had framed the project. 
Efforts to build implementation capacity were stalled and systems improvements in areas such 
as procurement were reversed or ignored by the authorities. (Independent Evaluation Group xx: 
2009) 
 
The lack of governmental support poses the biggest fundamental problem in 
implementing effective macro-level CSR; it can only work where governments are 
committed to making it work.  
Overall, we share IEG’s (Independent Evaluation Group) recommendation that the Bank Group 
should remain engaged in helping our clients to better manage extractive industries and large-
scale infrastructure. As we do so, there are important lessons from the Chad Cameroon 
Pipeline, most notably on the need to place ample emphasis on capacity building and to ensure 
country ownership and commitment to good governance, transparency and reforms as a critical 
underpinning to such potentially transformational project. (Independent Evaluation Group xxi: 
2009) 
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While it is discouraging that there is little external organizations can do to force 
compliance with programs that will better governmental institutions, the fact of the 
matter is that programs and review management schemes can be designed to 
effectively mitigate the resource curse.  There is enough knowledge as to what works 
in order to effectively eliminate issues and lead to better governance and development.  
While government officials might not be willing to implement these programs, these 
programs in and of themselves represent a paradigm shift in the understanding of 
resources and their effect on developing nations.  “[T]he Oversight Management Plan 
and the Revenue Oversight Committee, reveal potential designs for institutions in the 
future,” (Karl 275: 2009).  So knowledge as to proper economic policies is increasing 
and are being used more effectively even though the implementation of those policies 
is still reliant on a country’s government to be a willing participant.  
Morrison, in his 2010 research, draws from lessons from foreign aid in dealing with 
the resource curse and revenue from extractive industries.  He finds that there are 
comparable lessons to be learned from foreign aid.  He cites studies that have found 
there is no systematic evidence that aid influences governmental policies (World Bank 
1992b; Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1995; Collier 1997; Alesina and Dollar 2000; 
Burnside and Dollar 2000; van de Walle 2001; Easterly 2005; Heckelman and Knack 
2008).  Money alone can often not influence a government to make policy decisions it 
would not normally make.  Morrison argues that this means that companies and 
governments should not expect to have a great influence over policies that the 
government does not fully embrace and, if they did embrace “prudent” policies, many 
of them should already be in place.  If government officials thought that “good 
governance” was in their interest, why would they not be pushing for it regardless of 
incentives from outside forces?  Government officials are unlikely to enforce policies, 
even if they have enacted them, that they view as against their interests personal:  Even 
in situations like Chad where there is international monitoring, there is a strong 
incentive to cheat.  Within that context corporations and NGOs must understand 
whether they are dealing with legitimate representatives of the government or 
government officials that are corrupt and self-interested. 
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This creates a fundamental challenge to the effectiveness of macro-level CSR and 
what should be done with countries that do not have governments that will act in their 
people’s best interests. 
If states are unable or unwilling to take such steps, then the best solution may well be to leave 
the oil and gas in the ground. The fact is that oil in the ground is a nonwasting asset. Although 
leaving oil in the ground means that interest is forgone, the ground just might be the safest 
place for the asset, especially if there exists the risk that governments may use revenue for their 
purposes rather than for the good of society, as has happened so often already. In such cases, 
the people may benefit some, but clearly not as much as if the money were spent in ways that 
were directly intended to enhance their well-being. A judgment call is required, and not solely 
by the government of the host country, which often lacks the political will necessary to 
postpone extraction of natural resource reserves. (Humphreys et. all 15: 2009) 
 
The challenges of dealing with the resource curse and managing revenues are a 
“problem of historical consequence,” (Karl 275: 2009).   Norway, which is one of the 
countries that has done the best job of managing its oil revenues, did so from a 
position of already having good governance, efficient bureaucracies and well thought 
out and thorough financial planning (Karl, 2009).  Countries that have yet to develop 
these institutions face the large hurtles to creating good governance before oil is 
extracted.  It should be noted that progress can be made even after oil has begun to 
flow, and it might be a misconception that all countries must follow Norway’s “best 
practice”.  That being said, “Where serious deficits exist that block the free flow of 
information, monitoring, and the participations of the population, petrodollars simply 
cannot be spent efficaciously,” (Karl 273: 2009). 
Karl argues for a sequenced approach for improving governance.   
Greater access to information sets the framework for producing better monitoring, and both 
information and monitoring create incentives for involvement of those who currently are (but 
need not be) adversely affected by petroleum exploitation,” (267: 2009).   
She then argues that the next step is the creation of a tax system that allows the 
government to not to be solely dependent on petroleum revenues.  There is a tendency 
amongst petroleum producing democracies to lower taxes, but this should be avoided 
because it causes income inequality and narrows the tax base.  “Direct taxes promote 
not only more efficient bureaucracies but also liberal governance, and they do so as 
Mahon (2005) has shown, within a very few years of their implementation,” (Karl 281: 
2009). 
55 
 
5.6 Problems with macro-level CSR  
Large oil companies are trying to increase transparency through programs like the 
EITI and should be commended for publishing the amount they pay to governments, as 
previously those numbers where difficult to obtain and dubious at best when obtained.  
However, there is still a great lack of transparency concerning the corporations’ own 
CSR practices. Through its macro-level CSR activities, a corporation may be able to 
improve the governance of a country and the rights of self-determination of its 
population.  
However, because a corporation’s macro-level CSR activities in advising and assisting 
the government are usually not public, there is a question as to what advice it is giving 
and whether that advice is beneficial to good governance.  Because of the secretive 
nature of corporations, there is an issue of the ability of people to evaluate their CSR 
actions. Corporations can be either positive or negative forces, much like the resource 
revenues they provide.  The issue becomes: How can these CSR actions be evaluated 
in terms of the benefit they provide?  
The key finding of the Transparency International report was that the majority of the 42 
analysed companies ‘do not make sufficient efforts to report on their payments to host 
governments on a country-by country basis or to disclose the accompanying information on 
their operations and anti-corruption programmes’ (Transparency International, 2008, p. 24). 
Therefore, while companies publicly support transparency, they appear only to select a few 
areas for openness and they continue to be secretive about other areas. Indeed, CSR reporting 
and ‘transparency initiatives’ play a key role in influencing the media and public opinion 
because they help to portray firms as responsible citizens that care about people and the 
environment more than about profits. (Frynas 176: 2010) 
 
If the general public is not privy to a company’s meetings with governments or the 
advice that corporations provide to the government, then there is little way of ensuring 
that companies are aiding in good governance.  Corporate transparency becomes a 
major issue when dealing with macro-level CSR, because companies must keep many 
things secret in order to protect their business interests.  There needs to be a way to 
inject more transparency into corporate CSR programs so that civil society can 
evaluate whether the advice that petroleum companies are giving to the governments is 
beneficial. 
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With the expansion into macro-level CSR and influencing governance practices, a 
problem arises with regards to whom the corporations are accountable to. The premise 
of CSR is that the projects are undertaken to aid the stakeholders, but the question 
remains of how this is to be evaluated.  If NGOs or civil society are not active 
participants in the private meetings between corporations and governments, how can 
they hold either the government or companies responsible for the governance in the 
country?  As stated previously in this chapter, the EITI makes the assumption that 
there is an active civil society within countries that can make use of information that is 
made public.  But if these actors do not exist or are excluded from many of the 
governmental meetings or advisory sessions, accountability is undermined.  In this 
situation, no one knows what advice the corporations gave or whether the government 
accepted and acted on it.  
Without such knowledge, it is impossible to evaluate whether corporate CSR activities 
are helpful or not.  Often, the interests of the various stakeholders are not perfectly 
aligned.  While curbing inflation might be beneficial to everyone, not all actions would 
be.  For example, better governance could mean the enactment and enforcement of 
more stringent environmental rules for the protection of the population, but this may 
not be in the short-term interests of the corporation.    Similarly, tax policy might be 
unfairly skewed to benefit the corporation at the expense of the people.  In this 
situation, there needs to be an agent participating in the process that is acting for the 
people without a conflict of interest.  Corporations need to be accountable for their 
CSR activities just as much as governments should be accountable for their policies.  
The benefits and effectiveness of some macro-level CSR activities can be seen in their 
public implementation.  But, under the present system of macro-level CSR initiatives, 
there is no one to serve as a check on the non-public aspects of corporate activities to 
assure that they are uniformly beneficial. 
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5.7 The effects of competition on macro-level CSR 
There is a fundamental difference between macro-level and micro-level CSR 
initiatives when it comes to governments.  As shown in Chapter 4, micro-level CSR 
has very little ability to threaten existing power structures within a society, but macro-
level CSR is inherently designed to change those power structures.  Even if a country 
is already a democracy with a system of government based on the idea of limited 
duration of power, macro-level CSR will seek to enforce these ideals and is therefore a 
threat to any entrenched power.  Petroleum corporations which are dependent upon the 
existing government for permission to develop resources within the country have a 
delicate task in attempting to encourage the government to improve governance 
without alienating the source of their drilling rights. 
There are now more petroleum companies from countries like China and Malaysia 
which assert little or no pressure to promote good governance or human rights in the 
countries where they are seeking petroleum resources.  This creates a challenge for 
Western companies involved in macro-level CSR programs. 
An authoritarian regime does not have to fear that a Chinese oil company will attempt 
to interfere with poor governance or corrupt institutions.  This places Western 
companies with macro-level CSR programs at a disadvantage in obtaining petroleum 
concessions from corrupt governments.   
Collective action involving petroleum companies as seen with initiatives like the EITI 
is crucial to helping companies with CSR programs to remain competitive.  The recent 
initiatives by the US Securities Exchange Commission to require greater disclosure by 
all companies listed on US stock exchanges, regardless of their domicile, may help in 
forcing companies from China and other non-members of EITI to engage in better 
behavior, (Zhang Tao and Wang Xiaocong).  The proposed SEC rule states that “Any 
U.S.-listed company that extracts oil, natural gas or minerals must include in its annual 
financial report production data as well as licensing details, royalties, taxes and 
government fees for “each project,”” (Zhang Tao and Wang Xiaocong).  It remains to 
be seen whether this rule will be fully implemented and the detailed information that 
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must be reported, but it would expand the reporting required by EITI members and 
extend the reporting to non-EITI members if they are listed on a US stock exchange.   
This should help level the playing field so that Western corporations which are 
members of EITI are no longer at a competitive disadvantage.  Because of the fear of 
offending the government, petroleum corporations have generally been reluctant to be 
aggressive in pointing out or trying to remedy corruption, even when such corruption 
is detrimental to the corporation itself.  As Frynas points out in the previous section, 
there is little reporting of corruption within countries.  This fact is reiterated with the 
following passage: 
There are situations in which the costs of corruption lead to reduced profits. In these cases, 
companies' own interests may be a reason for fighting corruption. However, in many other 
situations, self-interest is not sufficient for companies to promote the fight against corruption. 
 
Although the rejection of corruption is now an integral part of any company’s social 
responsibility, it appears to remain a neglected social issue among CSR priorities (Hills et al., 
2009). There is still much work to be performed, both in the development of practices, which 
will lead eventually to the eradication of corruption, and in the development of reporting 
instruments, which will allow companies to adequately communicate their anti-corruption 
efforts.(Branco and Delgado1 6: 2012) 
 
Corruption is a difficult issue for companies that are dependent upon the government 
contracts and permission to operate to deal with.  Oil companies must attempt to 
maintain good relations with their host governments in order to retain their operating 
permits.  Failure to do so has resulted in the abrogation of contracts and expropriation 
of corporate assets of oil companies in Russia and several countries in Latin America.  
Thus, it is understandable that petroleum companies do not want to be overly critical 
of the governments of their host countries.  In the next chapter, I will discuss the 
problems BP faces  in combatting corruption in Azerbaijan and how local realities 
affect both the need for expanded CSR in this area and the difficulty in doing so.  If 
macro-level CSR is to be effective, anti-corruption efforts are a needed pillar of such 
actions.  The ability of the UN and international organizations to help with anti-
corruption efforts will also be demonstrated in the next chapter. 
One cannot discount the fact that companies themselves can benefit from corruption, 
where this is true they would be forced to act against their own self-interests, which 
they should do, but might not.  But, even when petroleum companies would benefit 
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from more honest government, they are in a difficult position.  There are large 
petroleum companies that are completely unconcerned with corruption from countries 
like China and Malaysia.  These companies do not comply even with EITI rules.  The 
competition for oil concessions by these petroleum companies mean that it is very 
difficult for them to push for even greater reforms.  For these reasons, both reporting 
of corruption and corporate CSR actions designed to curtail it have been lacking.  
While more can be desired in both areas, the ability of corporations to do more is 
severely limited by the realities of the situation.    
 
5.8 Summary 
Corporations can be of great help in promoting good governance and it advising their 
host governments with regard to management of resource revenues for the benefit of 
the economy and the people.  There are incentives for corporation to do so because 
good governance often reduces costs of doing business in a country and economic 
growth benefits companies by increasing demand for the commodities they produce.  
In addition, the positive public relations and gratitude of populations that are fostered 
by CSR activities are beneficial to companies.  These challenges primary present 
themselves on the macro-level and it is crucial that corporations implement macro-
level CSR programs to deal with them.  
The concept of macro-level CSR is still in its infancy, but great strides have been made 
and need to continue to be made if CSR is going to deal effectively with the issues 
associated with petroleum extraction.  BP has led the way on many of these initiatives 
and it is their forward thinking that has help create EITI and soon the EITI ++.  It is 
crucial that more research and more resources devoted to the field of CSR in order to 
ensure its continued development. 
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6 BP’s expanded use of macro-level 
CSR in Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan is a country that faces the issues of petroleum wealth and poor governance 
simultaneously.  It by no means has been a bastion for government reform, 
transparency and rectitude within its institutions.  BP plays a unique role in its macro-
level CSR relationship with the government of Azerbaijan.  Many of the concepts and 
theories discussed previously in this thesis can be seen put into action there.  
 
6.1 Background  
Hannes Meissner argues that states in the Caspian region need to be seen in their own 
context.  
First, there is a need for dynamic context analyses based on a distinction between three sets of 
context variables: (a) the Soviet and pre-Soviet legacies, (b) the resource specific conditions (c) 
the constellation of stakeholders, leader behavior and strategies, as well as externalities. 
Second, post-Soviet context analyses need to focus on the point in time at which national 
independence was gained. Third, the Soviet and pre-Soviet legacies characterize the 
particularities of the Caspian rentier states. In particular, similarities and differences should be 
formulated on the basis of seven Soviet and pre-Soviet context factors: (1) the domination by 
nomenklatura of the centralized state structure, (2) weak and inexperienced counter-elites, (3) 
passive societies, (4) informal networks, (5) the culture of corruption, (6) simplistic economic 
structures, (7) domestic and cross-national cleavages, (Meissner 34; 2010). 
 
This shows the complexity of trying to create a universal template for CSR programs, 
but it also shows the need for macro-level attention in order to build functioning 
institutions within the Caspian region.  
The government within Azerbaijan has not radically changed from its Soviet days 
which ended in 1991. Azerbaijan had very little experience with democracy and faced 
great instability after its separation from the USSR. It was led by five different 
presidents from 1991 to 1993.  In 1992 an election was held that was considered to be 
free and fair, but the elected leader was deposed shortly thereafter in a military coup.  
Another election was held in 1993 which Heydar Aliyev, the former the First Secretary 
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of the Azerbaijan Communist Party when Azerbaijan was under Soviet rule, won with 
99 percent of the vote.  His son is now President of the country and elections since 
1993 have been widely seen as fraudulent, (Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe).  Now it has a stable, if authoritarian government, headed by a 
ruling family, with son succeeding father as President.  Freedom House still describes 
Azerbaijan as “not free” (2012).  There has been little meaningful political reform 
within Azerbaijan and opposition has been held to a minimum through repressive 
activities by the government.  Transparency International ranks Azerbaijan as the 143
th
 
most corrupt country out of 183 in the world, and 13
th
 out for 20 for their region 
(2011).  The World Bank (World Bank website, b) currently has ranked Azerbaijan in 
the 9
th
 percentile for 2010 in the world for control of corruption or control of “the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,” meaning that they are 
doing little to control the amount of corruption that exists within the country. 
Independence from the Soviet Union meant that Azerbaijan could no longer depend on 
the Soviet export market. After this loss of friendly markets, the economy contracted 
60% (Cohen 2010).  With the discovery of oil and gas reserves in the country, 
Azerbaijan’s economy became largely dependent on oil and gas exports (Gulbrandsen 
and Moe, 2007).  This dependency has not abated with time and the country still 
remains largely dependent on oil and gas revenues.  The government has also been 
dependent on these oil and gas revenues as Azerbaijan lacks an effective means of tax 
collection (Hoffman, 1999).   
Azerbaijan also found itself in a tenuous geopolitical situation with enemies all around 
it in Armenia, Russia (which has been pro-Armenian), and Iran. Azerbaijan also was 
the subject of an attempted coup supported by Turkey and was singled out by the 
United States as the only former Soviet Republic not eligible for direct government-to-
government aid.  These difficulties meant that Azerbaijan had little economic means 
beyond what could be developed through its gas and oil reserves.  “Put bluntly, oil has 
been the only viable, export-capable economic lever independent Azerbaijan has ever 
known,” (Hoffman 8: 1999).  Thus Azerbaijan never had the option of waiting to 
establish well run institutions before developing the resource.  
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In 1992, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) was created. 
Shortly after the oil company’s creation, it was sidelined in negotiations with outside 
oil companies in favor of the Committee for Oil Development in Azerbaijan.  It has 
been alleged that in order to begin negotiations, petroleum companies were asked to 
deposit $300 million in the personal account of the head of the Committee, a friend of 
the President.  Western companies have maintained that no such payments were made 
as it was against corporate policies (Gulbrandsen and Moe, 2007).  
In spite of the efforts of BP and other organizations in Azerbaijan, serious governance 
and economic problems still remain.  Azerbaijan has been the poster child of the 
resource curse in that it showed below average development for its region and in 2005 
ranked as only moderately developed in the UN Human Development index (HDI).  
But with increased oil production, Azerbaijan has made a remarkable jump in their 
standard of living and now is considered highly developed in the UN HDI.  The jump 
in human development corresponds with a jump in oil exports from $6.88 billion in 
2005 to $25.1 billion in 2010.  (This is off from Azerbaijan’s high in 2008, but 2011 is 
projected to be the greatest year yet with a sharp increase (IMF 2012)).  The IMF then 
projects that oil revenues will stabilize.  The IMF also projects a slowing of economic 
growth in the future to around 2.2%, which is below the projected growth in advanced 
economies and well below the projected growth in developing economies.  
Azerbaijan faces problems with diversifying its economy, issues as a rentier state and 
creating an engaged civil society.   This means that Azerbaijan faces potential 
difficulties in advancing its economy and its people without increased oil exports.   
 
6.2 BP’s macro-level CSR initiatives in Azerbaijan 
In 1994, Azerbaijan signed a multi-decade contract with a consortium led by BP, 
called Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC).  While more than 30 
petroleum companies operate in Azerbaijan, the increase in oil production since 1997 
has come entirely through the BP led consortium (Gulbrandsen and Moe, 2007).  With 
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BP as the primary player in the petroleum field within Azerbaijan, BP has been 
uniquely positioned to try expansive CSR programs in Azerbaijan.  BP has long been 
one of the leading proponents of CSR within the petroleum industry.  Work that BP 
did with respect to revenue transparency helped bring about the creation of the EITI.   
With this experience behind it, BP has engaged in significant macro-level CSR 
programs to help improve the governance and standard of living in Azerbaijan.  BP 
has gone further than other companies in engaging the government of Azerbaijan in 
dialog about investment of oil funds and poverty alleviation.   
While BP initially focused on traditional community projects and did not address any broader 
societal issues in Azerbaijan, the company has more recently adopted a policy of dialogue with 
government on macro-level issues. Although framed as capacity building, it comes close to 
proffering advice on domestic policy: ‘Engage in policy-making processes and offer assistance, 
as appropriate, on the development and implementation of policy agendas, which include for 
consideration addressing poverty alleviation, revenue management, and domestic energy’. 
 
Obviously, there is little or no information regarding the exact nature of the advice proffered or 
assistance given by BP in its talks with the government, but the company has spoken out on 
sensitive issues. Corruption in government is a particular concern. In 2002, David Woodward, 
President of BP in Azerbaijan, publicly stated that ‘a clear distinction should be established 
between people in business and people in government, including a much clearer separation of 
the roles in those government bodies who currently act as both regulator and provider of 
services’. (Gulbrandsen and Moe 819: 2007) 
 
BP has focused its work in five different ways: 
 
[F]ive of the most important CSR activities and achievements of BP and its partners in terms of 
addressing macro issues: (1) engagement with the government, (2) pursuit of oil revenue 
transparency, (3) community investments, (4) national and regional development and (5) local 
business development. (Gulbrandsen and Moe 819: 2007) 
 
Through these efforts, BP has become an integral part of Azerbaijani development: 
BP not only comments on and criticises government policies from the outside, it is treated as a 
legitimate participant in broader development processes. It is, for example, involved with the 
UNDP in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan, a broad poverty alleviation programme. When 
the final document was presented in October 2002 to an auditorium gathering of government 
officials, international organisations, NGOs and diplomatic missions, BP was the only 
company invited by the government to give a presentation. Beyond BP'S general public 
statements on the need for good governance and fighting corruption it seems that the company 
stops short of advice on specific concerns. In recent years the company has sponsored groups 
of independent economic experts who engage government representatives and agencies on a 
range of specialist issues. According to our interviewees, such sessions, where the requests and 
needs of the government are given attention, have sometimes helped facilitate badly needed co-
ordination among government agencies, but there is no indication that they have addressed 
fundamental problems like corruption. (Gulbrandsen and Moe 820: 2007) 
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BP has also been involved in the operations of SOFAZ, the state run oil fund.  Cables 
from the US embassy leaked by Wikileaks have given a unique insight into BP’s 
concerns with the oil fund and its macro-level evolvement.  
BP has quietly launched an intensive effort to help the Government of Azerbaijan better 
manage its anticipated billions of dollars in energy revenue.  After years of discussions, the 
GOAJ (Government of Azerbaijan) agreed to place a BP-funded macroeconomic modeling unit 
at the State Oil Fund (SOFAZ). BP hopes the new macroeconomic modeling unit will improve 
GOAJ awareness of the dangers of mismanaging its oil revenues and promote a cohesive, long-
term approach to economic decision-making within the GOAJ.  BP Senior Economist Mark 
Henstridge told the Ambassador that high degrees of resource-dependency in economies like 
Azerbaijan's present enormous commercial risks to BP; BP Policy Advisor Jacob Nell (who 
had worked for several years as an advisor to Azerbaijan's Finance Ministry) more bluntly said 
that GOAJ mismanagement of its energy revenue presents the greatest risk to BP.  BP believes 
that Azerbaijan has "two or three budget cycles" (e.g. until 2008 or 2009) to set up proper 
procedures for revenue management in order to stave off hyperinflation.  Nell separately told 
the Ambassador that BP is also thinking of creating a trust fund to finance macroeconomic 
framework studies that would analyze the economic situation in Azerbaijan, another step to 
increase the public's awareness of the importance of proper economic management.  
Henstridge and Nell commented positively on the new GOAJ economic team led by Finance 
Minister Sharifov and Minister of Economic Development Babayev, and believe the new 
economic modeling unit will be a key tool for the team to get a better grip on the GOAJ budget 
planning and budget process. (Wikileaks) 
 
This memorandum shows two things: (1) it reveals the extent to which BP has gone to 
manage macro-level economic policy in Azerbaijan, and (2) it shows that often 
corporate interests run parallel with a country’s broader economic issues, thus giving 
companies and governments incentives to work closely together.   
It is not possible to conclude that BP’s advice has had a significant effect on the 
economy or inflation, as most of that data is not available to the public.  It is however 
clear that the feared hyperinflation never happened.
5
  
In Azerbaijan, BP has gone much farther than other companies in aiding in the direct 
management of the economy.   
BP supported an independent economic consultancy to help the State Oil Fund develop a 
software-based model of Azerbaijan's economy, with the purpose of strengthening the 
government's capacity to manage oil revenues and assess their long-term impact on the 
economy,” (Gulbrandsen and Moe 822: 2007).    
This type of expertise is essential for dealing with oil revenues and managing the 
economy.  It also shows that BP can have a larger influence on the macro-economic 
level through its policy advice, and can be a crucial player in the proper maintenance 
of the economy.  
                                                 
5
Even under the broadest definition of hyperinflation. 
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6.3 BP’s CSR initiatives with local businesses and 
communities 
In addition to its macro-level CSR activities in Azerbaijan designed to promote better 
governance at the national level, BP has also continued to engage local businesses and 
communities.  BP has assisted the local economy by employing local businesses to 
supply goods and services to BP projects. 
Within the new regional development scheme, formally connected to the business consortium, 
BP and partners have prioritised helping local suppliers access credit and develop micro-
finance schemes. A new instrument allowing local companies to use their contracts with BP 
and partners as collateral has also been developed. According to critics, the foreign oil 
companies are nevertheless failing to use domestic industrial capacity as much as they could, 
but BP itself is quite satisfied with its achievements in engaging local companies as partners in 
the oil industry. According to BP, the direct spending with local companies in 2005 'resulted in 
Azerbaijani suppliers achieving the third highest level of in country spend by revenue, after the 
US and UK, of any country where BP is represented'. BP intends to double the value of 
contracts placed by Azerbaijan-owned companies within five years (2010), amounting to an 
additional $250 million annually with small and medium-sized enterprises and local joint 
ventures, bringing its total spend with locally owned companies to more than $500 million a 
year.  (Gulbrandsen and Moe 825: 2007) 
 
This is helping industries where there is a relative advantage.  It is sound economic 
policy to invest where one has a relative advantage, and in time Azerbaijan might be 
able to become a competitive supplier of goods and services to oil companies 
worldwide.  For example, Norway has become an exporter of deep sea oil drilling 
technology, thus diversifying its economy into technology within that sector.  While it 
is still too early to see the total effect of these policies in Azerbaijan, or whether they 
amount to more than just subsidizing the local community, they could provide a 
template for increased micro-level CSR initiatives.  
Oil companies can help create additional jobs by engaging the local economy in 
supplying goods and services for the oil companies as much as possible. These 
initiatives have also given vital lines of credit to businesses that otherwise would not 
have had access to that credit and has keep more oil revenue within the country. And, 
unlike revenue going to the government, this revenue flows into the local economy 
creating jobs and stimulating other sectors.     
66 
 
BP is also involved in dealing with the local communities in Azerbaijan, but their 
programs have a more holistic approach than traditional local CSR.   
In contrast to traditional micro-level CSR projects such as funding the building of schools and 
health clinics, the Future Communities Programme aims to enable local communities to 
develop themselves by teaching them a set of skills and providing a toolbox to be self-
sustaining. In each community a community action group elected by the inhabitants is set up to 
identify needs and prioritise among them. The community is trained to work out a budget, and 
to write a proposal for a tender process, a procurement plan, project implementation plan and 
long-term management plan. The training focuses on financial transparency and effective 
governance in all stages of the project. In this way, claim BP representatives, communities 
learn to plan and manage development projects in a transparent and effective manner. BP aims 
to engage local government authorities without giving them control and envisages that 
community investments will also be a learning experience for them. The programme also tries 
to involve regional governors, but deals only rarely with the central government. (Gulbrandsen 
and Moe 825: 2007) 
 
By engaging local governments and focusing on good governance, there exists a 
possibility to promote ground up reform.  Such programs also help create the 
expectation and understanding of good governance by the people.  In addition to 
providing a learning environment about good governance, involvement at the local 
level also provides native insight into what is needed by the local communities.   
Within the best practices of CSR, educating the populace to participate in designing 
and running such projects is considered vital to aiding the community.  Creating an 
engaged and capable civil society is a vital step towards all CSR ends and therefore 
has to be seen as an imperative to dealing with poor governance and its threat to 
countries’ economic prosperity.  While government building can be a long and 
laborious process, the engagement of local community to better their own lives has to 
be seen as a start towards better governance.  
 
6.4 BP’s involvement in broader regional initiatives 
BP has also tried to incorporate the broader Caspian region in its development plan 
and to help aid the business interests of neighboring countries as a whole.  
The second CSR initiative that BP operates on behalf of its consortia partners is the Regional 
Development Initiative. It was conceived in 2003 and became fully operational in 2005 after 
agreement with the other oil companies on financial commitments, internal governance 
structure, operational guidelines and a three-year strategy and budget. The initiative is intended 
to enhance oil and gas partners' long-term business interests and contribute to sustainable 
socioeconomic development in the Caspian region… 
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The initiative covers Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan, with 50% of funding allocated to the 
latter, for the full lifespan of the projects. Unlike the Future Communities Programme, it is 
directly focused on macro-level issues and large-scale, country-wide and cross-regional 
programmes. According to a BP representative, 'it's an investment approach to development 
rather than the old philanthropy'. It also brings in money from the main lenders, particularly the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank, which 
basically match the contributions from the oil companies. The international financial 
organisations seem to have concluded that their leverage in Azerbaijan is diminishing by the 
day as oil export income soars. Co-operation with the oil companies is one of the few vehicles 
allowing commitment to broader programmes that will not be subject to the whims of the 
government. Their participation has also spurred co-ordination among the oil companies. 
(Gulbrandsen and Moe 824: 2007) 
 
This offers a way for populations to move forward without their governments which 
might not have their interests in mind.  A combined approach both working with the 
government and outside of it can both improve the government and provide outside 
development and pressure for reform. 
 
The Regional Development Initiative seeks to maximise its developmental impact by focusing 
on three core themes: enterprise development, effective governance, and access to energy. The 
focus has thus far been on enterprise development, but BP also sees a significant potential for 
enhancing effective governance through civil society capacity building, strengthening the rule 
of law, and proffering expert advice and assistance.  
The Regional Development Initiative is unique because it unites all the oil companies in all 
four joint ventures led by BP in a common and long-term CSR partnership, and involves 
matters relating to social organisation and institution building. All selected projects are run 
through a complicated vetting process by all consortium partners. BP and its partners have 
committed to the initiative for as long as the PSAs run, which will be for another 20 years, an 
extraordinarily lengthy period for a joint CSR project. (Gulbrandsen and Moe 825: 2007) 
 
The scope and length of this program are extraordinary and by uniting several 
companies, it has created an integrated plan.  There are of course problems that come 
with this integration as it creates large inefficiencies and bureaucracies that must be 
dealt with because of the number of actors involved (Gulbrandsen and Moe 2007).  
But it is a new approach to dealing with the issues facing countries where oil flows 
have already come online.  This may be a means by which oil companies might be 
able to apply pressure and assure responsible governance even when much of the rest 
of the international community has lost its ability to influence the government due to 
the government’s significant revenue flows.  If the international community matches 
funds with oil companies, international organizations’ resources and expertise can 
remain relevant and helpful even outside of their traditional advisory role.  
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The regional aspect of this program also helps to eliminate one of the fears of micro-
level CSR, which is creating conflict between communities - between those who have 
CSR programs and those who that are left to fend for themselves.  In a geopolitical 
climate like the one in which Azerbaijan exists, there are considerable ethnic and 
political tensions both within and between countries.  By helping neighboring 
countries as well as Azerbaijan, soft-power
6
 can be an effective tool in assuring further 
development without exacerbating tensions.  Other communities can see that by 
adopting similar policies and engaging in economic reforms, they too can benefit.  The 
creation of cooperative projects rather than adversarial relationships can help 
rationalize the cessation of tensions and build stronger links or repair links between 
once adversarial countries and communities.  
 
6.5 Concerns about BP’s CSR initiatives in 
Azerbaijan 
While BP has been innovative in expanding the CSR role to the macro-level and has 
aided in advising the government, it is still too soon to declare it a success.  It goes 
more to show that an expanded role of corporations to a governmental advisory role is 
possible.  
Like many macro-level CSR programs, problems of transparency and legitimacy 
remain: when evaluating BPs role in Azerbaijan the whole picture cannot be seen as 
many of the meetings and much of the advice is secret.  Therefore, to say that BP is 
aiding in the management of funds and the development of Azerbaijan, is to make 
assumptions based on too little time and too little information.  In fact, since CSR is 
often seen as primarily a public relation tool, one should be skeptical of reports 
released by BP unless they are substantiated.  
                                                 
6
 “[S]oft power—getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them.” 
(Nye 95: 2008) 
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Transparency is also hindered by the fact that governments would be reluctant to 
participate in public meetings or release documents which criticize their existing 
practices.  Giving advice concerning good governance is a delicate task in any 
situation.  It would be especially difficult for an authoritarian government to reveal 
what advice it received and whether it acted upon it.  However, it is difficult to 
evaluate the effectiveness, merit or benefits of advice given in private. 
While BP has disclosed its payments to the government and has been pushing for 
greater transparency by the government, more must be done to assure that measures 
are being taking to move towards good governance.  Thus far BP has not used a 
comprehensive approach and, while they have reached out to governments like the US, 
the issues that were raised and BP’s advice is only known to the public because of the 
leak of classified documents.  The lack of public scrutiny by either NGOs or the 
general public makes it problematic to assess the results of such efforts.   
 
6.6 BP’s efforts to combat corruption 
As stated previously in this chapter, Azerbaijan still remains very corrupt and there is 
little transparency about how the oil revenues received by the government are spent. 
BP’s 2003 report on activities in the Caspian region admits that the large revenue 
inflows “potentially encourage corruption,”(134: 2003).  In this respect, BP has been 
criticized for not doing enough to combat corruption in Azerbaijan.  Gulbrandsen and 
Moe state that BP “stops short of advice on specific concerns” (820: 2007) when 
dealing with the corruption.  It has been suggested that the interests of the oil 
companies and the government often coincide and that the oil companies’ actions, 
either overtly or inadvertently, support the corrupt government. 
It has been argued, for instance, that oil companies in Azerbaijan ‘have (inadvertently at times) 
backed the Aliev government’s intimidation of dissidents through outright bribery, patronising 
only government-favoured media or businesses, and eschewing extended contacts with the 
political opposition’ (Chen, 2007, p. 43). A suggestion of a meeting with opposition politicians 
in Azerbaijan was met with ‘less than no interest’ by the oil companies (Gulbrandsen and Moe, 
2005, p. 59). One scholar noted that: ‘the warm and cozy relations of the Azerbaijani 
government with trans-national oil companies ensure the flow of funds at the expense of state 
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and democracy building in the country’ (Valiyev, 2006), quoted in (Chen, 2007, p. 44.). 
(Frynas 175: 2010) 
Benjamin Sovacool has argued for his concept of “corporatist resource curse” he 
defines it as: 
The corporatist resource curse suggests that when private corporations partner with 
government actors to extract point resources such as oil or natural gas as rapidly as possible to 
inflate revenues, the resulting activities consolidate wealth for these actors but distribute costs 
to society. In the pursuit of profit and extended control, the interests of the corporatist 
government and business actors overwhelm those of civil society and the public, who are 
unable to offset corporate–government influence due to lack of knowledge, capacity and/or 
market distortions. (45: 2011) 
 
Sovacool has analyzed the BTC pipeline project that BP is working on in Azerbaijan 
as well as other countries in the region.  
[T]he corporatist resource curse predicts that when government and corporate interests align to 
extract resources quickly, they benefit at the expense of less organized and more diffuse social 
actors and communities.  The case of the BTC pipeline validates this theory, and it shows how 
such a curse can extend beyond the simple extraction or use of oil to its distribution and transit 
through a pipeline. (54: 2011) 
 
 
In general, oil companies’ reporting of corruption is lacking, as the following 
quotation shows: 
Company reporting on corruption is also very limited, even by companies with highly 
developed codes of conduct. Henriques (2007) specifically points to the examples of Shell and 
BP. Shell, for instance, limits their corruption reporting to the number of ‘violations’ explicitly 
reported to the Audit Committee of the Board of Royal Dutch/ Shell, and providing specific 
figures for Nigeria.  
However, as Henriques points out, the company fails to report on the nature of legal 
prosecutions, the use of agents or whistle-blowing – all of which are crucial to understanding 
both the problem of corruption and the company’s ability to deal with the problem. (Frynas 
176: 2010) 
  
Criticism of BP by academics might be overly harsh; BP’s has a limited ability to 
bring about government reforms.  BP finds itself in the same position as any extractive 
company does with respect to government corruption.  Since it is dependent upon the 
existing government for its permit to drill for oil in Azerbaijan, it cannot be too 
forceful in its criticism of the government, or it will risk losing its ability to do 
business in the country.  This can represent a tremendous loss in invested capitol and 
potential future profits.  While it may make suggestions about better ways of managing 
revenues and running governmental institutions, it has no way to compel the 
government to follow that advice.  Criticizing overt corruption within the government 
can be difficult to do without appearing threatening to corrupt government officials.  
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From a business perspective BP and other corporations have to walk a fine line and not 
appear to be biting the hand that feeds them.  BP’s role is solely advisory, and while it 
may be criticized for not doing enough to combat corruption and promote good 
governance, its role is strictly limited.  In many ways, a soft, gradual approach may be 
better than a more strident one, since a more forceful approach may just get BP 
expelled from the country and replaced by another oil company which would do even 
less to promote governmental reform.  While BP might be able to do more, it is 
already doing more than most oil companies in similar circumstances.   
 
6.7 Some Solutions to the problems 
BP has already taken one step to create an outside review and greater accountability 
for its CSR activities by setting up the Azerbaijan Social Review Commission which is 
an independent organization with the mission statement, “to promote transparency, 
dialogue and public engagement of our (BP’s) activities in Azerbaijan,” (BP website 
c).  While this independent group is a good step towards monitoring, it is limited in 
scope.  So far, it has produced five brief reports on the effects and consequences of 
BP’s actions. In their latest report they recommended the following; 
Develop a civil society engagement plan (relationship building and communication) based on 
the civil society map – targets, messages, mechanisms, feedback. Engagement is more than 
communication (see below), it involves building relationships. 
Develop a communication program to establish BP’s independent nature (media and civil 
society). Such a program identifies audiences, messages, delivery mechanisms, etc. 
Find a way to make public statements in support of fundamental freedoms and rights as good 
for business, in support of open societies (The Azerbaijan Social Review Commission 18: 
2011) 
 
BP has made the following response: 
 
[W]e have been supporting various effective governance projects, including business enabling 
environment with IFC involving the Ministry of Taxes and capability building in 
macroeconomic forecasting with the EU-based think-tank for the Ministry of Economic 
Development (MED). 
We continued to back the Advisory Services on Macroeconomic Management and Institutional 
Reforms (ASMMIR) project. As part of ASMMIR we underwrote efforts to enhance economic 
planning capacity in Azerbaijan by improving forecasting skills and economic policy analysis 
in the MED. This project, launched in September 2008, was scheduled to last for 24 months 
but has been extended for a further 17 months and will now end in January 2012. Also as part 
of ASMMIR, a methodological framework for quarterly economic reviews was elaborated in 
2010. Experts assisted MED staff in preparation of these reviews and in development of 
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monthly analysis of inflation, gross domestic product, the global economy, exchange rates, 
commodity markets and other topics. 
By supporting such initiatives we believe that BP is contributing to the efficient management 
of revenues generated by the oil and gas industry and that this will bring long-term socio-
economic benefits to Azerbaijan. (BP Azerbaijan Response 4: 2011) 
 
So, while some monitoring is happening, it is not as robust and inclusive as is 
necessary to assure open and transparent governance.  
Another valuable step would be the integration of the activities of the UN and BP in 
Azerbaijan.  The UN, and BP through its macro-level CSR initiatives, are already 
trying to accomplish similar goals in Azerbaijan.  They are natural partners and the 
UN can aid BP in providing legitimacy and transparency to its operations, while BP 
can offer resources and expertise in advising the government.  The UN is currently 
engaged in development programs with the government of Azerbaijan.  
[T]he intended focus of the UN development support between the period 2011 and 2015, and 
focuses on those areas where the UN has comparative advantage and proven track record 
where the UN can add value. The cooperation framework focuses on three programme areas: 
economic development, social development, and good governance, and aims to deliver the 
following outcomes by 2015:  
· A diversified economy ensuring sustainable growth across many sectors, generating 
decent work opportunities and improved incomes for all regions and social groups;  
· Improved and equal access to quality health, education and social protection services; 
and  
· More transparent and accountable public institutions, staffed by a professional civil 
service and guided by appropriate laws enforced by a responsive judicial system to 
ensure the legal protection of the rights of all, including the most vulnerable.  
 
The new UNDAF will also emphasize further advancing gender equality, integrating risk 
reduction into development programmes, and strengthening Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) 
as the cross-cutting areas, given that the elaboration of M&E indicators against which to 
measure progress towards the expected results has been integral to the development of new 
UNDAF and will further guide its implementation.   
 
The UN agencies will provide assistance and technical support in implementing the next 
UNDAF which is estimated at US$92.5 million. The UN Country Team, under the leadership 
of the Resident Coordinator, will be responsible for the harmonization, alignment and results-
orientation within the UN system, in partnership with the development partners, to ensure the 
delivery of the UNDAF outcomes. (UN in Azerbaijan) 
  
Since the stated goals of the UN and BP mirror each other, a good step forward would 
be the integration of their initiatives.  This would aid in achieving their aims and 
permit more pressure to be placed on the Azerbaijani government, which lacks 
creditability in being, open, honest, and fair.  This added pressure would make both 
organizations more effective in lobbying for changes.  
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Such integration would solve one of the independent reviews issues of having access 
to the media and a communications program which can support fundamental rights.  
Giving the UN the role of much of the media relations would both insulate BP from 
potential political backlash of pushing for reforms and also would make calls for 
reforms seem more authentic and substantiated.  It would also give the UN the 
potential ability to implement broader anti-corruption measures and apply pressure to 
both the government and BP to safeguard the population’s interests against the 
interests of those two actors. 
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7 Conclusion and recommendations 
The premise of this thesis has been that where petroleum extraction exists, there are 
great tensions placed on the institutions of government by the increased revenue 
inflows.  This pressure can distort the economy, leading to inflationary pressures and 
making the non-energy related sectors of the economy less competitive.  The 
understanding of the “resource curse” is changing and is really the curse of bad 
governance.  Macro-level CSR can play a crucial role in helping to build better 
governance and to manage revenue inflows to make sure that they do not distort the 
economy. The steps that are necessary to protect the economy and prevent distortion 
include (1) the creation of an effective sovereign wealth fund, which can invest money 
outside of the country to curb inflationary pressures, (2) investment in human capital, 
making the country more competitive for the future, and (3) investment in industries 
that are intensive in the commodity they are exporting where they have a relative 
advantage.  On the policy side, taxes should be kept in place and where needed they 
should be broadened so that economic growth will benefit the country.  
Micro-level CSR projects like building schools and hospitals can help in bettering the 
lives of local communities affected by the operations of oil companies, but they are not 
designed to deal with larger scale systemic problems of governance and economic 
planning.  And, as I point out as my original contribution to the existing literature, 
such micro-level projects may actually be detrimental to the establishment of better 
governance and planning by lessening the pressure on governments to institute 
reforms, since they serve to pacify the population by satisfying some of their more 
immediate needs. 
While the issues faced by oil exporting countries are extremely complex and often 
unique to each individual country, there is an increasing understanding of what good 
policy should look like.  Macro-level CSR is one of the avenues that should be pursued 
in bringing about the implementation of policies that better governance and economic 
management.   Macro-level CSR has the ability to advise the government in 
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establishing  prudent policies that will promote better governance and stronger 
institutions which will assist in economic growth and development and produce better 
governed, more prosperous and more peaceful societies. 
While there are questions about both the role and motives of corporations with respect 
to CSR activities concerning governance, no one can deny their influence. The oil 
corporations themselves will always be powerful actors since they are the direct source 
of revenues. It is therefore crucial that their influence be harnessed to promote better 
governance within the countries in which they operate. More openness about corporate 
CSR activities would permit their benefits and effectiveness to be better evaluated.  
With the right advice and careful oversight from civil society and international actors 
like the UN, oil corporations can prove the hero rather than the villain they are often 
perceived to be. 
The use of a comprehensive approach involving international organizations and NGOs 
in CSR, will result in better controls on corruption and give assurances to the 
population that corporations are acting in a beneficial way.   Incorporating the UN into 
the comprehensive approach would offer added legitimacy as well as better insuring 
the rights of people to self-determination.  The UN has goals similar to the stated goals 
of corporate CSR initiatives and therefore the two entities should be natural allies.  
Working together could strengthen both entities.  
Initiatives like the EITI have not been around long enough to truly test their 
effectiveness, but the effect of mere reporting of revenue inputs seems limited in 
nature, and there is little real evidence that it will help in curbing corruption.  
However, if the EITI ++ is created and countries work within its guidelines, it might 
hold real promise for managing oil revenues better and promoting economic and 
political development within exporting countries, because it will deal with both 
revenues received and spent.  The EITI ++ will engage countries with international 
actors like the World Bank which will help to legitimize and strengthen ties between 
good governance and the international community.  More must be done to engage and 
integrate the UN on the issues faced by resource exporting countries.   
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There still remain large obstacles to implementing good governance. For instance there 
is still no reasonable way to impose good governance from outside.  Government 
officials must feel that good governance is in their interests in order to be willing to 
bring about changes and this can be a difficult problem.  Corporations are dependent 
upon their host governments for permission to operate within the country.  Therefore, 
the reality is that corporations cannot be too critical or their host governments or press 
too aggressively for reforms if they wish to preserve their operations within the 
country.    The oil companies would incur huge losses if their operations were 
expropriated or they were expelled from the country by a hostile government. The 
situation is further complicated by the fact that there are other oil companies from 
countries like China and Malaysia, that do not share western concerns about good 
governance, which would be happy to replace them. 
However, there is still hope that even small reforms can lead to bigger reforms in the 
future.  But, in order for such reforms to happen, the petroleum industry has to 
understand the macro-level nature of the problems caused by oil revenue inflow and 
deal with them on a macro-level as well. BP’s CSR Initiatives in Azerbaijan are a 
demonstration of potential future macro-level CSR initiatives. While not enough time 
has passed to declare them to be a success or failure, BP’s activities are on the cutting 
edge of macro-level CSR.   
If good governance and good institutions can be fostered, there is hope for future and 
lasting peace in some of the most volatile countries on earth.  This aim is one worth 
pursuing and deserving of more research.  Appropriately designed and implemented 
corporate CSR macro-level CSR activities can contribute to the achievement of this 
goal.  
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7.1 Policy recommendations for macro-level CSR 
initiatives 
Based on the analysis done in this thesis, I may make some policy recommendations 
for what the petroleum industry should seek to achieve with their macro-level CSR 
programs.  
(1) The first and most important recommendation is that properly functioning 
institutions capable of dealing with the problems should be set up before the 
exploitation of the resources begins.  This has been advised by many prominent 
scholars, (Humphreys et. all 2009, Hoffman 2010).  It is far easier to set up institutions 
and make governmental reforms before governments are inundated with huge amounts 
of revenue which stress the ability of government institutions to manage them and 
which may lead to more corruption.  Setting up a working government first is not 
always an option, like in the case of Azerbaijan, where exploitation of their resources 
was seen as the only economic option available.  Where it can be done, it is the most 
prudent policy that can be pursued.  There is nothing to say that the following 
recommendations cannot be pursued before resources are exploited (ideally) or pushed 
for afterwards or while resources are already being exported (where it is the only 
possibility). 
(2) The keys to all initiatives are transparency and accountability. Without these, there 
is little hope that funds can be invested wisely (Karl 2009).  It is therefore of utmost 
importance that corporations push for more transparency and accountability in the host 
governments.  They can and should engage the help of the international community in 
this regard.   Corporations should push for a broader approach to transparency by 
requiring transparency in how the revenues are spent as well as how much revenue is 
received by the government.  Even if such transparency is achieved, there might not be 
adequate NGO or civil society participation to use the information to bring about 
reforms, so corporations should work with national and international actors to assure 
that governments are held accountable for their spending.  
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(3) Macro-level CSR should make sure that resource revenues are invested wisely, in 
human capital, useful infrastructure, and diversification of the economy to sectors 
where the country has a relative advantage.  Although transparency is vital, the 
population may not possess an advanced understanding of how economies operate and 
may not be depended upon demand policies that will assure long term growth.  Here 
corporations can provide expertise and personnel to aid in making prudent investment 
choices.  Corporations should advise countries to invest in long term growth strategies 
and increase their investment in education and healthcare, both of which can improve 
their economic performance and prosperity.  One of the key ways corporations can act 
is to make sure that countries do not become complacent. Governments should be 
advised to plan ahead to the time when the resources have declined.  Even if mineral 
deposits are substantial and will not be depleted for some time, once countries reach 
peak production, the mineral sector cannot be relied upon to sustain economic growth 
and development.  Peak oil will be reached well before deposits are depleted so it is 
important that countries not delay investing for the future.  The petroleum industry can 
help drive home this reality to host governments.  
(4) Macro-level CSR should help countries to establish sovereign wealth funds to 
manage the investment of resource revenues in ways that will prevent inflation and to 
produce long-term investment returns that will benefit the economy when resource 
revenues decline or the resources are depleted.  There is a tendency to use sovereign 
wealth funds inappropriately or to mismanage them either from lack of experience or 
because of corruption.  BP in Azerbaijan has done an admirable job, in both advising 
in investment and management of the fund with economic modeling and experts, and 
also in pushing for transparency within the fund.  This can be a model for other 
companies working with macro-level CSR.  
(5) Countries need to get good advice and have precise economic models and 
understand both the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches as they invest 
for the future.  This also includes expert advice about tax policies, economic policies 
and anti-corruption efforts.  In this regard, it is crucial that countries avoid a rentier 
state mentality since this will both impede good governance and inhibit economic 
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growth.  Countries must avoid policies that favor the elites as that will hinder their 
future economic growth.  The problems facing each country will be different and there 
has to be sufficient planning and understanding of each individual case.  Macro-level 
CSR can help in tailoring programs to each country’s economic and political realities.  
While this list of policy recommendations is not exhaustive, it demonstrates a general 
way forward when promoting macro-level CSR within the petroleum industry.  Case 
specifics will vary greatly.  Authoritarian governments will be the places where the 
establishment of best practices will be the most difficult.  While it would be better if 
they moved towards representative government, this might not be a feasible option in 
the short-term.  A policy of engagement by corporations might be better than a policy 
of non-engagement where the resources will be exploited anyway.  Corporations can 
work to advise countries about both the benefits of prudent policies and how to 
implement those policies.  The main role for the corporation within macro-level CSR 
should be an advisory role rather than an operational one.  While corporations can 
undertake hands on activities to some extent, one of the key concepts of macro-level 
CSR is that corporations should emphasize helping help populations and government 
officials understand the proper role of government rather than supplanting it.   
 
7.2 Areas for future research   
Corporate CSR needs to subjected to rigorous academic study to develop prudent 
methods and to test their effectiveness.  More must be done to discover the extent and 
content of policy recommendations offered in macro-level CSR.  Individual case 
studies as well as studies as to the effectiveness of certain adopted policies are 
extremely important and as of yet have not been thoroughly studied.  Because macro-
level CSR is a new field, the possibilities for research remain wide open and ideas 
about incorporating a comprehensive approach and other potential means for oversight 
of macro-level CSR need further exploration.  The fields of governance and 
development are also expanding, so as research reveals new factors, the policy 
implications need to be incorporated and added to existing knowledge.  
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It is clear that problems arise from the exploitation and exporting of resources and 
research should focus on ways to ease the burden on government institutions as well as 
aiding in the implementation of prudent policies.  It is my hope that with future 
research, petroleum revenues can come to be seen as a blessing rather than the “curse” 
they have often been in the past.   
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